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ABSTRACT
SUPPLY CHAIN CONTRACTING IN THE PRESENCE OF SUPPLY
UNCERTAINTY AND STORE BRAND COMPETITION
by
Xinyan Cao
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2018
Under the Supervision of Professor Xiang Fang
In today’s complex business environment, manufacturers are striving to maintain a com-
petitive advantage over their supply chain partners. Manufacturers’ profitability is tightly
linked to their strategic interactions with other entities in the supply chain. While numerous
studies have been conducted to investigate such interactions in supply chains, certain issues
remain unresolved. We apply a game-theoretic framework to analyze two distinct supply
chain structures in the presence of supply uncertainty and store brand competition in two
essays, respectively.
In the first chapter, we study a decentralized assembly supply chain under supply un-
certainty. In a decentralized assembly supply chain, one assembler assembles a set of n
components, each produced by a different supplier, into a final product to meet an uncer-
tain market demand. Each supplier faces an uncertain production capacity such that only
the lesser of the planned production quantity and the realized capacity can be delivered to
the assembler. We assume that the suppliers’ random capacities and the random demand
can follow an arbitrary continuous multivariate distribution. We formulate the problem as
a two-stage Stackelberg game. The assembler and the suppliers adopt a so-called Vendor-
Managed-Consigned-Inventory (VMCI) contract. We analytically characterize the equilib-
rium of this game, based on which we obtain several managerial insights. Surprisingly, we
show that when a supplier’s production cost increases or when his component salvage value
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decreases, it hurts all other members and the entire supply chain, but it might sometimes
benefit this particular supplier. Similarly, when the suppliers do not have supply uncertainty,
it benefits the assembler but it does not necessarily benefit the suppliers. Furthermore, we
demonstrate that when the suppliers’ capacities become more positively correlated, the as-
sembler is always better off, but the suppliers might be better or worse off. Later in the
chapter, we also solve the game under the conventional wholesale-price contract. We find
that the assembler always prefers the VMCI contract, and the suppliers always prefer the
wholesale price contract. In addition, we illustrate that the VMCI contract is more efficient
than the wholesale price contract for this decentralized assembly supply chain.
In the second chapter, we consider a two-tier decentralized supply chain with a national
brand supplier and a retailer. The national brand supplier (she) distributes her products
to consumers through the retailer. Meanwhile, the retailer (he) intends to develop and
produce his own store brand through a manufacturing source that is different from the
national brand supplier. The retailer holds the store brand production unit cost as private
information, for which the national brand supplier only has a subjective assessment. Given
a supply contract offered by the national brand supplier, the retailer simultaneously decides
whether to accept the contract and whether to produce the store brand. The national brand
supplier aims to design an optimal menu of contracts to maximize her expected profit as well
as extract the retailer’s private cost information. We formulate the problem as a two-stage
screening game to analyze the strategic interaction between the two players. Despite the
inherent computational complexity, we are able to derive the optimal menu of contracts for
the national brand supplier, of which the format depends on the national brand supplier’s
unit production cost. Furthermore, we investigate how the model parameters affect the value
of information for each member in the supply chain. We show that the retailer’s private cost
information becomes less valuable to both the national brand supplier and the retailer when
the national brand unit production cost increases. We also illustrate that when the gap
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between the two possible cost values increases, the private cost information becomes more
valuable to the national brand supplier, however the value of information to the retailer
himself can either increase or decrease. Finally, we demonstrate that when the perceived
quality of the national brand increases, the value of information to the retailer first decreases
then increases, but the impact on the value of information to the national brand supplier
can be either positive or negative.
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Chapter 1
Component Procurement for an
Assembly Supply Chain with Random
Capacities and Random Demand
1.1 Introduction
In recent years, outsourcing has become a common practice in a number of industries, includ-
ing automobiles, electronics, computers, and others, in which Original Equipment Manufac-
turers (OEMs) outsource the component production to independent suppliers (or contract
manufacturers) and finish the assembly in-house. Kallstrom (2015) reported that the auto-
motive suppliers’ proportion of value added to worldwide automobile manufacture has been
steadily increasing from 56% in 1985 to 82% in 2015. Rajaram (2015) pointed out that “The
global market for electronics contract manufacturing (ECM) services should total $515.6
billion in 2015, and reach nearly $561.2 billion by 2016 and $845.8 billion by 2021, with
a five-year compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 8.6% from 2016-2021.” These OEMs’
operations heavily depend on the reliability of the component supply. Sodhi and Tang (2012)
commented that “problems in one link of the supply chain have caused unmitigated disaster
to another link, resulting in large financial and non-financial damage.” In particular, when
the upstream supply capacity is uncertain, it might affect downstream OEMs significantly.
For example, due to supply problems, Sony had to delay the launch of Sony PlayStation 3 in
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2006, which hurts not only Sony’s short-term revenues but also its long-term market share
(Sodhi and Tang, 2012).
There are various reasons for the supply capacity uncertainties, such as unforeseen pro-
duction line breakdown, suspended delivery due to disagreement, and so on. In 2014, an
eye-catching news story in the technology industry was the winding-down relationship be-
tween Apple and one of its suppliers, GT Advanced Technology (GTAT). Apple planned to
use the sapphire crystal glass manufactured by GTAT on the iPhone 6 and two models of
Apple Watch. However, GTAT failed to deliver the agreed amount and quality of glass to
Apple, and ended up filing bankruptcy due to the financial pressure. Consequently, Apple
had to turn to a different material for the screen (Gokey, 2015). A more recent case in
2016 was that two Volkswagen suppliers, one following the other, suspended contractually
agreed deliveries of components. This shortage of components led to bottlenecks in produc-
tion, causing severe disruptions at several Volkswagen factories (Bronst, 2016). Numerous
cases have shown that the supply uncertainty has a significant impact on such an assem-
bly supply chain since the supply chain performance is determined by the bottleneck agent
(Gurnani and Gerchak, 2007). Taking account of the uncertainties from all suppliers and an
often uncertain market demand, the supply chain risk could be even more significant. Such
supply chains are further complicated by the fact that each component supplier and the
manufacturer are independent entities which seek to maximize their own profits. Hence, in
this chapter, we seek to study the strategic interactions among the upstream suppliers and
the downstream manufacturer in a decentralized assembly system in the presence of random
capacities from the suppliers and random demand from the market.
We consider a decentralized assembly supply chain with one manufacturer (referred as
assembler hereafter) and n suppliers each producing a different component. The assembler
assembles the n components into a final product to satisfy a single-period uncertain market
demand with an exogenous fixed retail price. Each supplier’s production capacity is uncertain
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as well. We assume the random demand and the suppliers’ random capacities follow an arbi-
trary multivariate continuous distribution. In our base model, we assume that the assembler
and the suppliers adopt a Vendor-Managed-Consigned-Inventory (VMCI) contract. That is,
each supplier manages his own inventory and the assembler only pays to each supplier for
the components actually used by the assembler according to the pre-agreed unit price. We
formulate the problem as a two-stage Stackelberg game. First, the assembler proposes a unit
price to each supplier. Second, the suppliers make their own production quantity decisions
simultaneously. Then the suppliers’ uncertain capacities are realized. Each supplier’s final
deliverable quantity is the lesser of its realized capacity and planned production quantity.
The suppliers deliver their available components to the assembler who will then assemble
the components into final products to satisfy its realized market demand, and each supplier
collects a payment from the assembler.
As noted by Gümüş et al. (2008), VMI and consignment inventory are two separate
supply chain strategies, i.e., VMI permits the vendor to initiate orders for the customer,
while consignment inventory means that the vendor owns the goods until the customer uses
them and the vendor is only paid for the goods used by the customer. Although VMI
can be implemented with or without consignment inventory in practice, a recent survey
by Gatorpoint Research across various industry sectors including wholesale, manufacturing,
retailing, and telecom regarding their VMI strategies indicates that “49% of responders
use consigned inventory at their buyers’ VMI location ”(Gatorpoint Research 2013). In
our VMCI contract, we assume that the assembler and the suppliers adopt the VMI and
consignment inventory together because without the consignment inventory agreement (i.e.,
the suppliers are only paid for the components delivered to the assembler), the suppliers
would deliver as much inventory as possible to the assembler. Similar VMCI contracts are
adopted in Gerchak and Wang (2004), Fang, et al. (2008), Bazan et. al. (2014), and Lee
and Cho (2014). In a general VMI contract without consignment inventory, an upstream
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supplier may decide the inventory level and the delivery schedule for a downstream retailer
according to predetermined minimum and maximum inventory levels set by the retailer, and
the retailer owns the inventory upon receiving it. (see Fry et al. 2001). Bischescu and Fry
(2009) assume that a continuous review (Q,R) inventory policy is used in a supply chain,
where the supplier determines the replenishment quantity Q and the retailer decides the
reorder point R. More discussions about various forms of VMI contracts can be found in a
recent survey paper regarding VMI by Gorvidan (2013).
Despite the complexity, we are able to derive the analytical equilibrium prices and or-
der/production quantities in closed-forms for the VMCI contract. Our results illustrate sev-
eral important managerial insights for the decentralized assembly supply chain under supply
uncertainties. Under the VMCI contract, we obtain the following results. First, when a
supplier’s production cost increases, we show that the profits of the assembler, all other sup-
pliers, and the entire supply chain all decrease, but the profit of this particular supplier may
sometimes improve. This result is quite surprising but it is consistent with similar results
derived in Fang et al. (2008) and Granot and Yin (2008). Second, when a supplier’s com-
ponent salvage value increases, it benefits the assembler, all other suppliers, and the entire
supply chain, but surprisingly it may hurt this supplier himself. This result is relatively new
in the literature since the salvage values are assumed to be zero in Fang et al. (2008) and
Granot and Yin (2008). Third, by comparing our results with those in Gerchak and Wang
(2004), we find that when the suppliers display no capacity uncertainties, the assembler is
always better off, but the suppliers may sometimes be worse off. These three results suggest
that the assembler may need to offer some incentives to suppliers with certain cost structures
to reduce his production cost or capacity uncertainty and to improve his salvage value since
such actions may hurt the suppliers but always benefit the assembler. Fourth, we observe
that when the final product retail price increases or the assembly cost decreases, every one
is better off. This result validates our intuition, and it is indeed consistent with most liter-
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ature. Last but not the least, we demonstrate that when the suppliers’ random capacities
become more positively correlated under the multivariate normal distribution, the assembler
is always better off, but the suppliers may be better or worse off. We believe this result is
new since it is often assumed in the literature that random yield/capacity distributions are
independent. Based on this result, we suggest that under a VMCI contract, the assembler
could select suppliers from the same regions such that the suppliers’ random capacities may
be positively correlated.
In addition to the base model under the VMCI contract, in section 1.6, we also ana-
lyze and solve the game under the traditional wholesale-price contract (i.e., without VMI or
consignment inventory), i.e., the suppliers first choose their respective wholesale prices simul-
taneously, then the assembler orders from the suppliers. Comparing the respective results
from the wholesale price contract and the VMCI contract, we show in section 1.7 that the
assembler and entire supply chain would prefer the VMCI contract, whereas the suppliers
would prefer the wholesale price contract. This result is consistent with Gerchak and Wang
(2004) who study the same two contracts for a decentralized assembly system with perfectly
reliable suppliers.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 1.2, we provide a liter-
ature review. In section 1.3, we present our model setup for the decentralized system under
the VMCI contract, and then derive the optimal production plan for the corresponding cen-
tralized system as a benchmark. In section 1.4, we characterize the equilibrium behaviors
for both the suppliers and the assembler in the decentralized system under the VMCI con-
tract. We then derive our managerial insights regarding the VMCI contract in section 1.5.
In section 1.6, we present the model and the equilibrium results for the traditional wholesale
price contract. In section 1.7, we compare the system performance and individual firm’s per-
formance under the VMCI contract with those under the wholesale price contract. Finally,
we conclude the chapter with major findings and further research directions in section 1.8.
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All mathematical proofs are summarized in a separate Appendix.
1.2 Literature Review
Our work is most related to two streams of literature regarding supply uncertainties and
assembly systems. Supply uncertainties can be attributed to different causes in the pro-
duction process. In the literature, the supply uncertainties can be characterized into three
categories: random capacity, random yield, and supply disruption. Random capacity de-
notes an uncertain exogenous upper bound on the actual production quantity (Bollapragada
et al. 2004). Random yield refers to the situation where only a random fraction of products
turn out to be usable due to production defects, machine breakdowns, and so on (Yao 1988).
Supply disruption can be considered as a special case of random capacity with a Bernoulli
distribution following which either the full order or nothing is delivered (Gurnani et al.
2000). On the other hand, the papers studying assembly systems can be grouped in two
categories, i.e., decentralized and centralized assembly systems. In a centralized assembly
system, the assembler aims to derive the optimal inventory policy for all the components and
the optimal component allocation policy among various final products among which com-
mon components are shared (Song and Zipkin 2003). Due to outsourcing, the assembler now
faces a decentralized assembly system. The research focus in decentralized assembly systems
is to study the strategic interactions under contractual arrangements among independent
component suppliers and the assembler who seek to optimize their own profits (Gerchak and
Wang 2004). We summarize the relevant papers in Table 1.1.
There are abundant papers studying random yields in the area of supply chain and oper-
ations management. In Table 1.1, we only list the papers analyzing both random yields and
assembly systems. In particular, Yao (1988), Gerchak et al. (1994), Gurnani et al.(2000),
and Pan and So (2010) explore the inventory/production/pricing decisions for a centralized
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Table 1.1: Papers related to supply uncertainties and assembly systems
Decentralized Assembly System Centralized Assembly System
Random
Yield
Gurnani & Gerchak (2007)
Güler & Bilgiç (2009)
Güler (2015)
Pan & So (2015)
Yao (1988)
Gerchak et al. (1994)
Gurnani et al. (2000)
Pan & So (2010)
Supply
Disruption
Li et al. (2017)
Gurnani et al. (1996)
DeCroix (2013)
Yin et al. (2017)
Random
Capacity
This essay
Bollapragada et al. (2004)
Xiao et al. (2010)
Bollapragada et al. (2015)
Ji et al. (2016)
assembly system subject to random supply yields and investigate how the random yields
affect the system performance. A few papers study random yields in a decentralized assem-
bly system. Gurnani and Gerchak (2007) propose a contract to coordinate a decentralized
assembly system with two component suppliers both experiencing random yields and an as-
sembler facing a deterministic market demand. Güler and Bilgiç (2009) extend their work by
establishing two coordinating contracts with three parameters for a decentralized assembly
system consisting of N suppliers with random yields and an assembler with random market
demand. Under the same system structure as that in Güler and Bilgiç (2009), Güler (2015) is
able to form a coordinating contract with two parameters only. Pan and So (2015) derive the
equilibrium production and pricing decisions for a decentralized assembly system with two
suppliers under a similar VMI contract to our VMCI contract, and one of the two suppliers
is exposed to the random yield.
There are several papers investigating the optimal inventory/ordering policies for the
centralized assembly system with supply disruptions, e.g., Gurnani et al. (1996), DeCroix
(2013), and Yin et al. (2017). We found only one recently published paper, i.e., Li et al.
(2017), studying a decentralized assembly system with two suppliers and one assembler, and
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they assume one of the two suppliers faces the supply disruption. In their work, they explore
how a cost-sharing contract would affect the performance of individual firms and the entire
system.
Compared with the vast amount of the random yield literature, Feng (2010) points out
“There are relatively few papers analyzing random supply capacity.” We here focus on the
papers studying centralized assembly systems with random capacity. For example, Bollapra-
gada et al. (2004) characterize the optimal base-stock inventory policy which minimizes
the total inventory investment in a centralized assembly system. Xiao et al. (2010) study
a single-product single-period assemble-to-order system with uncertain assembly capacity,
and they identify conditions under which an assemble-in-advance strategy should be adopted
to maximize the centralized system profit. Bollapragada et al. (2015) explore the compo-
nent procurement and assembly decisions for a cost-minimizing assembly system. Ji et
al. (2016) derive an optimal production planning decision for a centralized single-period
cost-minimizing assembly system with random production and assembly capacity. All these
papers study a centralized assembly system where the assembler decides the inventory de-
cisions for the entire system. However, we study a decentralized assembly system (supply
chain), where the focus is to apply game theory to explore the strategic interactions among
the suppliers and the assembler.
To our best knowledge, our study is the first one that considers a decentralized assembly
system with random supply capacities. We build a general model for the decentralized
assembly system with n suppliers (each of whom experiences a random capacity) and an
assembler facing a stochastic market demand. Furthermore, our model allows the random
capacities of the n suppliers to follow any arbitrary multivariate continuous distribution
with correlations, while all the papers for random yield and random capacity listed in Table
1.1 assume independent distributions. Incorporating correlated random capacities into our
model, we are able to show that when the suppliers’ capacities become more positively
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correlated under a general multivariate normal distribution, the assembler is always better
off, but the suppliers may be better or worse off. Our work can be considered as an extension
of Gerchak and Wang (2004). Our model setup is similar to theirs except that they assume
all suppliers are perfectly reliable whereas we relax this assumption and consider that all
suppliers have random capacities. Compared with their results, we demonstrate that when
a component supplier faces an uncertain capacity, it always hurts the assembler, but it may
sometimes benefit this specific supplier, which is quite surprising.
1.3 Model Setup
In this section, we first elaborate our model setup for the decentralized assembly system under
the VMCI contract, then we solve the corresponding centralized system as a benchmark for
the decentralized system.
1.3.1 Decentralized System under VMCI Contract
We consider a decentralized supply chain with n upstream suppliers and a downstream
assembler. Without loss of generality, we assume one unit of the assembler’s final product
consists of n (sets of) components, each produced by a different supplier, i.e., supplier i (he)
produces component i (i = 1, ..., n). The assembler (she) assembles the n components into
the final product to satisfy a single-period uncertain market demand, D, with a fixed retail
price of $p per unit. The assembler and the suppliers agree to adopt the VMCI contract,
i.e., each supplier manages his own inventory and the assembler only pays to each supplier
for the components that are actually used by the assembler based on the pre-agreed unit
price. Before the final demand D is realized, the assembler initiates the procurement in
advance by offering a unit price, wi, to supplier i, i = 1, ..., n. Given the prices, the suppliers
make their own production decisions simultaneously, i.e., supplier i decides his production
quantity Qi and incurs a total production cost of ciQi, in which $ci is the unit production
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cost for component i. Furthermore, each supplier’s production capacity, Ki (i = 1, ..., n) is
uncertain. The random vector (K1, ..., Kn, D) is assumed to follow an arbitrary multivariate
continuous distribution. After each supplier’s uncertain production capacity is realized, only
min {Qi, Ki} units of component i can be delivered to the assembler. In most cases, the
assembler’s assembly time is much shorter than the suppliers’ lead time, so we assume that
the assembler can start the final assembly after demand D is realized and the assembly cost
is c0 per unit. Thus, the assembler can sell min {mini=1,...,n(Qi, Ki), D} units of the final
product to the market. Each supplier collects the payment from the assembler for the used
components. Unassembled components, if any, are salvaged by each supplier at a salvage
value of $si/unit for component i. Assume ci > si so that the suppliers will not produce
unlimited components. si can also be negative to represent a disposal cost, if applicable. We
assume all parties are risk neutral and that all information about the retail price, salvage
value, costs, and distributions are common knowledge to all parties.
Figure 1.1: Sequence of events.
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1.3.2 Centralized System
We now analyze the corresponding centralized system as a benchmark for the decentralized
system. In a centralized assembly system, the assembler, as a central planner, decides the
production quantity, Qi, ∀i = 1, ..., n, for each component to maximize the total system
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profit, denoted as ΠC , as follows:
ΠC(Q1, ..., Qn) = E{(p− c0) min
i=1,...,n
(Qi,Ki, D)−
n∑
i=1
ciQi +
n∑
j=1
sj [min(Qj ,Kj)− min
i=1,...,n
(Qi,Ki, D)]
+}
= E{(p− c0) min
i=1,...,n
(Qi,M)−
n∑
i=1
ciQi +
n∑
j=1
sj [min(Qj ,Kj)− min
i=1,...,n
(Qi,M)]
+}, (1.1)
where M
def
= min(K1, ..., Kn, D). For notational convenience, let fM(.) and FM(.) be the
respective PDF and CDF of M , which can be derived from the multivariate distribution of
(K1, ..., Kn, D) since FM(x) = 1 − Pr(K1 > x, ...,Kn > x,D > x),∀x . The total system
profit ΠC here simply represents the assembler’s revenue from selling the final products
to satisfy the uncertain market demand D minus the assembly cost and the component
production costs plus the revenue from salvaging leftover components. Recall that without
loss of generality, we assume that each final product is composed of one unit of the n
components. Hence, it is straightforward to derive the following result:
Lemma 1.1. The optimal solution to problem (1.1) satisfies Q1 = ... = Qn
def
= Qc.
Note that the assembler has to match the n components to assemble the final product.
It is best for the assembler to plan the same production quantity for all components, i.e.,
Q1 = ... = Qn, because for each additional leftover component, the assembler can only get the
salvage value of the component, which is lower than the production cost of the component.
Substituting Q1 = ... = Qn = Qc into (1.1), we have
max
Qc
ΠC(Qc) = E{(p− c0) min
i=1,...,n
(Qc,M)−
n∑
i=1
ciQc +
n∑
j=1
sj[min(Qc, Kj)− min
i=1,...,n
(Qc,M)]
+}.
For notational convenience, let fD(·) and FD(·) denote the marginal probability density
function (PDF) and cumulative distribution function (CDF) of D, respectively. Similarly,
let fi(·) and Fi(·) be the marginal PDF and CDF of Ki, i = 1, ..., n, respectively. We do not
make any assumption on the relationship among the probability distributions of D and Ki,
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for example, Ki is stochastically larger(smaller) than D or Kj, j 6= i. As we will show in
the remainder of the chapter, our result holds valid without any of such assumptions. After
some algebra, we can show the following result:
Proposition 1.1. ΠC is strictly concave in Qc. Hence, the optimal solution to the centralized
problem given by (1.1), denoted as Q∗c, is uniquely determined by
(p− c0 −
n∑
i=1
si)F̄M(Q
∗
c)−
n∑
i=1
ci +
n∑
i=1
siF̄i(Q
∗
c) = 0, (1.2)
where F̄i(x)
def
= 1− Fi(x) for all i = 1, ..., n,D,M .
1.4 VMCI CONTRACT
In this section, we apply the backward induction method to study the decentralized system
under the VMCI contract, i.e., we first analyze the suppliers’ problem in section 1.4.1, and
then we investigate the assembler’s optimal pricing scheme in section 1.4.2 based on the
anticipated best responses from the suppliers.
1.4.1 Suppliers’ Problem
Given any prices, w1, ..., wn, offered by the assembler, the n suppliers make their respective
production decisions simultaneously to maximize their own expected profits. To encourage
each supplier to produce a positive quantity of his component, the assembler must propose
a feasible contract such that wi > ci for all i = 1, ..., n. We aim to characterize the Nash
equilibrium (or equilibria) for the suppliers’ production decisions, (Q1, ..., Qn). To do so, we
first need to derive the best response production quantity for supplier i, i = 1, . . . , n, given
other suppliers’ production quantities, defined as Q−i = Qj such that j ∈ {{1, ..., n} \ {i}}.
For any given Q−i, supplier i chooses Qi to maximize his expected profit function as follows:
Πi(Qi|Q−i) = E{wi min
j=1,...,n
(Qj,M)− ciQi + si[min(Qi, Ki)− min
j=1,...,n
(Qj,M)]
+},
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In supplier i’s profit function, the first term is the payment he gets from the assembler for
the components used in the final product, the second term is the supplier’s production cost,
and the last term represents the supplier’s revenue from salvaging his leftover components,
if any.
For notational convenience, we define Q−i = minj=1,...,n,j 6=i
(Qj). Hence, supplier i’s profit
function can be further reduced to two forms based on two possible scenarios (I) Qi ≤ Q−i,
or (II) Qi > Q−i, as below.
Πi(Qi|Q−i) =
{
ΠIi (Qi|Q−i), Qi ≤ Q−i
ΠIIi (Qi|Q−i), Qi > Q−i
where
ΠIi (Qi|Q−i)
def
=wiE[min(Qi,M)]− ciQi + siE[min(Qi, Ki)−min(Qi,M)]+, (1.3)
ΠIIi (Qi|Q−i)
def
=wiE[min(Q−i,M)]− ciQi + siE[min(Qi, Ki)−min(Q−i,M)]
+. (1.4)
ΠIi and Π
II
i are continuous at Qi = Q−i.
When supplier i plans a production quantity Qi that is lower than any other supplier’s
production quantity, the assembled quantity of the assembler’s final product becomes only
dependent on Qi but not Q−i. We can derive the first order condition for Π
I
i (Qi|Q−i) as
∂ΠIi (Qi|Q−i)
∂Qi
= (wi − si)F̄M(Qi)− ci + siF̄i(Qi) = 0. (1.5)
Since wi > ci > si and F̄i(·), i = 1, . . . , n,M are decreasing functions, ΠIi is strictly
concave in Qi. Note that at Qi = 0,
∂ΠIi (Qi|Q−i)
∂Qi
= wi − ci > 0, and as Qi approaches to
∞, ∂Π
I
i (Qi|Q−i)
∂Qi
→ −ci < 0. There exists a unique solution to the first-order condition of
ΠIi (Qi|Q−i) given by equation (1.5).
However, if supplier i plans a higher production quantity than some other supplier, then
Qi will not constrain the final product quantity, but it still affects supplier i’s own production
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cost. It is straightforward to show that the first derivative of ΠIIi (Qi|Q−i) is
∂ΠIIi (Qi|Q−i)
∂Qi
= −ci + siF̄i(Qi) < 0,
which implies that ΠIIi (Qi|Q−i) is strictly decreasing for all Qi > Q−i. Combining the
properties of functions ΠIi (Qi|Q−i) and ΠIIi (Qi|Q−i), we obtain the following result:
Lemma 1.2. Given any Q−i chosen by the other n − 1 suppliers, supplier i’s optimal pro-
duction quantity, Q∗i , is
Q∗i = min(Q̃i, Q−i),∀i = 1, ..., n, (1.6)
where Q̃i is the unique solution to (1.5).
Note from (1.5) that Q̃i is a function of wi. Hence, we can analyze the relationship
between Q̃i and wi, which can be characterized in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1.3. Q̃i is increasing in wi.
Lemma 1.3 echoes with our intuition that a higher unit price offered by the assembler
tends to drive up the supplier’s planned production level.
Solving the n best response functions given by (1.6) simultaneously, we are able to char-
acterize the Nash equilibrium (N.E.) for the suppliers’ problem in the Proposition below.
Proposition 1.2. For any (w1, ..., wn) chosen by the assembler, any (Q
∗
1, ..., Q
∗
n) satisfying
Q∗1 = ... = Q
∗
n ≤ min
j=1,...,n
(Q̃j)
def
= Q̃ constitutes a N.E. for the suppliers, among which
Q∗1 = ... = Q
∗
n = Q̃ is the unique Pareto-optimal N.E.
Proposition 1.2 indicates that all suppliers would produce the same quantity in equilib-
rium. This result is driven by the fact that the assembler needs to assemble the suppliers’
components into final products to sell in her market, so unmatched components will not
be used and paid by the assembler. Therefore, in equilibrium, every supplier shall produce
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the same quantity. Although there are numerous equilibria for the suppliers’ problem, there
always exists a unique Pareto-optimal N.E., i.e., Q̃, which maximizes the expected profit for
every supplier among all the equilibria. As a result, we consider this equilibrium solution as
the outcome of the suppliers’ problem.
1.4.2 Assembler’s Problem
Anticipating that all suppliers simultaneously choose their Pareto-optimal N.E., Q̃, given in
Proposition 1.2, the assembler’s decision problem is to choose the optimal pricing scheme to
maximize her expected profit, i.e.,
max
(w1,...,wn)
Π0(w1, ..., wn) = E[(p− c0 −
n∑
i=1
wi) min(Q̃,M)]. (1.7)
According to the VMCI contracting arrangement, the assembler pays the suppliers only for
the components used in the final product. We first obtain the following property for the
assembler’s optimal pricing scheme:
Lemma 1.4. The assembler’s optimal pricing scheme, denoted as (w∗1, ..., w
∗
n), satisfies
w∗i = si +
ci − siF̄i(Q̃)
F̄M(Q̃)
, i = 1, ..., n, (1.8)
under which we have Q̃1 = ... = Q̃n = Q̃.
The result of Lemma 1.4 can be explained as follows. From Lemma 1.3, we know that
for all i = 1, ..., n, as wi increases, Q̃i increases. Because Q̃ = min
i=1,...,n
Q̃i, it is best for the
assembler to set up the prices such that the optimal prices would induce Q̃1 = ... = Q̃n = Q̃.
Otherwise, there exists Q̃j such that Q̃j > Q̃, then reducing wj to lower Q̃j to equal Q̃
would simply improve the assembler’s unit profit margin without reducing her expected
sales volume.
Following Lemma 1.4, we can transform the assembler’s problem given by (1.7) to the
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following problem:
max
Q̃
Π0(Q̃) = {p− c0 −
n∑
i=1
[si +4i(Q̃)]}S(Q̃), (1.9)
where
S(Q̃)
def
= E[min(Q̃,M)] (1.10)
4i(Q̃)
def
=
ci − siF̄i(Q̃)
F̄M(Q̃)
,∀i = 1, ..., n (1.11)
S(Q̃) represents the expected sales quantity of the final product.
For the remainder of the chapter, we assume that (A1) Ki (i = 1, ..., n) and M have
increasing failure rates (IFR) (i.e.,
fj(Q̃)
F̄j(Q̃)
,∀j = 1, ..., n,M , is increasing in Q̃), and (A2) M is
smaller than any Ki in the hazard rate order. As discussed in Gerchack and Wang (2004),
commonly used distributions, including uniform, normal, and Weibull families subject to pa-
rameter restrictions, have IFRs. Gupta and Gupta (2001) prove that when (K1, ...Kn, D) fol-
low a multivariate normal distribution, M retains the IFR property. SinceM = min(K1, ..., Kn, D),
M can be considered as the system lifetime of a serial system with n+ 1 parts. (A2) simply
means that at time t, the failure rate of this serial system is higher than the failure rate of
any individual part in the system, i.e., fM (t)
F̄M (t)
≥ fj(t)
F̄j(t)
,∀j = 1, ..., n,D (see Boland et al. 1994).
After some algebra manipulation, we can obtain a unique optimal solution to the assembler’s
problem, formally described in the Proposition below.
Proposition 1.3. There exists a unique solution, Q̃∗, to the assembler’s problem (1.9),
which can be determined by solving
−
n∑
i=1
4′i(Q̃∗)S(Q̃∗) + [p− c0 −
n∑
i=1
si −
n∑
i=1
4i(Q̃∗)]F̄M(Q̃∗) = 0. (1.12)
Note that without assumptions (A1)-(A2), the optimal Q̃∗ can also be found by solv-
ing (1.12), which means the existence of the N.E. is always guaranteed. Moreover, when
16
(K1, ..., Kn, D) follow a multivariate normal distribution, we do not need these assumptions
to derive the managerial insights regarding correlations among random capacities and de-
mand in section 1.5.4.
1.5 Managerial Insights
In this section, we investigate how variations in the model parameters influence the equilib-
rium as well as the expected profits of the suppliers, the assembler, and the entire supply
chain. The results here could provide useful managerial insights for managing the decen-
tralized assembly supply chain in the presence of supply uncertainty and random demand.
To facilitate our discussions, we use Π∗0, Π
∗
i (i = 1, ..., n), and Π
∗
D =
∑n
j=0 Π
∗
j to denote the
equilibrium expected profits for the assembler, supplier i, and the entire decentralized supply
chain, respectively. Moreover, in the remainder of this chapter, we refer to “decrease” and
“increase” in a weak sense, i.e., “decrease” means “ non-increase,” and “increase” means
“non-decrease.”
1.5.1 Component Cost
We first analyze how a change in the component costs can affect the suppliers’ production
decision (Q̃∗) and the assembler’s pricing scheme (w∗1, ..., w
∗
n) in equilibrium and the sub-
sequent profitability of every supply chain member. Suppose all other model parameters
stay the same, except that one supplier’s, say supplier i’s, component cost ci increases. The
following result illustrates the impact of such an increase in ci on the equilibrium and the
profits.
Proposition 1.4. Suppose supplier i’s unit cost, ci, increases. Then,
(i) Q̃∗ decreases;
(ii) w∗j for all j = 1, ..., n, j 6= i decrease, but w∗i increases;
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(iii) Π∗0, Π
∗
D, and Π
∗
j decrease for all j = 1, ..., n, j 6= i.
As one supplier’s cost increases, this supplier tends to plan a lower production quantity.
This tendency leads other suppliers to produce less as well since the suppliers are only paid
for the components used in the assembler’s final product and the assembler’s final production
quantity is limited by the supplier who delivers the lowest quantity. As illustrated by the
numerical example in Table 1.2, when supplier 1’s cost increases, the assembler would offer
supplier 1 a higher price (w∗1) to compensate him. However, anticipating that all suppliers
shall plan a lower identical production quantity in equilibrium, the assembler has room
to offer lower prices to all other suppliers (e.g., w∗2 decreases in Table 1.2) because these
suppliers’ costs remain unchanged. Given lower prices, all other suppliers’ profits would
decrease. Intuitively, the assembler, as the leader of the game, also suffers from any supplier’s
cost increase, and we prove that the entire supply chain suffers as well.
Table 1.2: n = 2, p− c0 = 200, s1 = s2 = 10, c2 = 50, K1, K2, D (are i.i.d) ∼ Exp(0.01)
c1 Q̃
∗ w∗1 w
∗
2 Π
∗
1 Π
∗
2 Π
∗
0 Π
∗
D Π
∗
C Π
∗
D/Π
∗
C
28 17.37 43.00 80.05 119.83 239.27 1041.94 1401.03 1761.2 79.55%
38 15.07 56.20 75.06 127.36 175.15 833.3 1135.81 1438.95 78.93%
48 13.04 67.99 70.95 122.17 128.01 658.75 908.93 1159.46 78.39%
58 11.22 78.69 67.79 109.77 92.83 512.66 715.26 918.05 77.91%
68 9.57 88.52 64.53 93.66 66.36 390.79 550.82 710.95 77.48%
78 8.08 97.63 61.95 76.15 46.41 289.86 412.42 535.04 77.08%
Interestingly, we observe that this particular supplier (i.e., supplier 1 in Table 1.2) may
sometimes become better off when his production cost increases (see the entry as bolded).
As explained earlier, the assembler would offer a higher unit price to the supplier whose
production cost increases. Facing a higher price and a higher cost at the same time, this
supplier’s profit margin might increase or decrease, as indicated by our example in Table
1.2. In conjunction with a lower equilibrium production quantity which leads to a lower
sales in the final product market, this supplier could be better or worse off. This result is
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surprising yet consistent with the result in section 6.2 of Fang et al. (2008) and Proposition 3
in Granot and Yin (2008). Under the VMCI contract, the suppliers are not always motivated
to improve the efficiency of their production processes. Therefore, the assembler might need
to provide additional incentives for suppliers to reduce their costs.
One can easily prove that the optimal decentralized system profit is strictly less than
the optimal centralized system profit due to double-marginalization. In order to explore
how the decentralized system efficiency is affected by each supplier’s component cost, we
quantify the decentralized system efficiency as Π∗D/Π
∗
C . Although the derivative of Π
∗
D/Π
∗
C
with respect to ci is analytically intractable, our numerical experiments demonstrate that
the decentralized system efficiency decreases in the supplier’s production cost, as illustrated
by the last column of Table 1.2. This observation has been consistently confirmed by 1000
runs of simulations based on randomly generated data sets. Under the VMCI contract, each
supplier (game follower) bears his own overstocking risk, which would be amplified when his
production cost increases. The supplier, being self-interested, shall then plan his production
more conservatively, which hurts the entire system.
1.5.2 Salvage Value
Second, we investigate how the variation in the component salvage values can affect the
equilibrium decision and the resulting expected profit for each member. Recall that we
assume si < ci,∀i = 1, . . . , n, to guarantee that no supplier would produce an unlimited
quantity.
Proposition 1.5. Suppose supplier i’s salvage value, si, increases. Then,
(i) Q̃∗ and w∗j increase for all j = 1, ..., n, j 6= i;
(ii) Π∗0, Π
∗
D, and Π
∗
j increase for all j = 1, ..., n, j 6= i.
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Proposition 1.5 (i) indicates that when supplier i’s salvage value improves, the suppli-
ers’ equilibrium production quantity increases and the equilibrium prices for all suppliers
except supplier i also increase. A higher salvage value for supplier i’s component can, to
some extent, mitigate this supplier’s overstocking risk, which therefore drives up his own
production quantity, and the assembler does not need to offer a higher price to supplier i.
However, to induce all other suppliers to plan a higher production quantity in equilibrium,
the assembler would have to offer higher prices to them since these suppliers’ cost structures
remain unchanged. As a result, all other suppliers’ profit margins are greater given higher
prices so that these suppliers are better off.
Surprisingly, when supplier i’s own salvage value increases, supplier i may sometimes
be worse off, as illustrated by the numerical example given in Table 1.3 (see the entry as
bolded). This result is surprising but consistent with the similar result derived above for the
component cost. As indicated in the example, when supplier 1’s salvage value (s1) increases
which tends to benefit this supplier, but the assembler would offer supplier 1 a lower price
(w1) which tends to hurt supplier 1’s profitability. Consequently, these two conflicting factors
may drive supplier 1’s profit either up or down. However, the assembler, acting as the leader
of the game, always benefits from an increase in any supplier’s component salvage value, and
the entire supply chain profit improves as well.
Table 1.3: n = 2, p− c0 = 120, s2 = 29, c1 = 50, c2 = 30, K1, K2, D (are i.i.d) ∼ Exp(0.005)
s1 Q̃
∗ w∗1 w
∗
2 Π
∗
1 Π
∗
2 Π
∗
0 Π
∗
D Π
∗
C Π
∗
D/Π
∗
C
16 18.97 63.12 33.82 118.96 35.28 380.83 535.07 689.83 77.57%
26 20.78 62.27 34.27 121.87 43.12 418.54 583.53 749.44 77.86%
36 22.92 61.24 34.84 123.11 53.63 463.93 640.67 819.06 78.22%
46 25.47 59.92 35.55 121.29 68.02 519.34 708.66 900.98 78.65%
Similar to section 1.5.1, we again compute Π∗D/Π
∗
C to evaluate the effect of one compo-
nent’s salvage value on the decentralized system efficiency. The example provided in Table
1.3 demonstrates that when component 1’s salvage value s1 increases from 16 to 46, the
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decentralized system efficiency increases from 77.57% to 78.65%. All our numerical results
(1000 simulations) show that when one component’s salvage value increases, the decentral-
ized system efficiency improves as well. As one component’s salvage value increases, this
component supplier potentially faces less inventory risk of overstocking. Therefore, this
supplier tends to produce more of his components, which benefits the overall decentralized
system.
1.5.3 Retail Price and Assembly Cost
Third, we explore how a change in the retail price or assembly cost of the final product
impacts the equilibrium production quantity, pricing decisions, and each party’s profitability.
With some derivations, we summarize the results in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1.6. Suppose the final product’s retail price p increases (or the assembly cost
c0 decreases). Then,
(i) Q̃∗ and wj increase for all j = 1, ..., n;
(ii) Π∗0, Π
∗
D, and Π
∗
j increase for all j = 1, ..., n.
When the retail price of the assembler’s final product increases or when the assembler’s
assembly cost decreases, the assembler has motivations to induce all suppliers to produce
more by paying higher prices to the suppliers. Consequently, every supplier’s profit improves.
As the leader of the game, the assembler always benefits when she gets a higher retail price
for her product or when she incurs a lower assembly cost. Since every one is better off, the
entire supply chain is better off as well.
1.5.4 Correlations among Random Capacities and Demand
Assume (K1, ..., Kn, D) ∼ N(µ,Σ), i.e., the random vector follows a multivariate normal
distribution with mean vector µ and covariance matrix Σ = [σij]i,j=1,...,n+1, where the corre-
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lation coefficient between i and j, j 6= i, ρij = σij/
√
σiiσjj.
Proposition 1.7. If σab for some a 6= b; a, b = 1, ..., n+1 increases, then the random variable
M stochastically increases, and Π∗0 increases as well.
Note that the proof of Proposition 1.7 is based on the theory of supermodularity in
Topkis (1998), hence assumptions (A1)-(A2) are not required to prove this result. As σab
increases, the correlation coefficient, ρab, increases. When any two of the random variables in
(K1, ..., Kn, D) become more positively correlated, M becomes stochastically larger. Recall
that M is defined as min(K1, ..., Kn, D) which represents the maximum quantity the assem-
bler can sell to the market, and the assembler’s final sales is actually the minimum of M
and Q̃∗. When M increases, even if the assembler induces the suppliers to produce the same
quantity (Q̃∗), the assembler’s profit would still increase because she can sell more products
to the market without increasing her costs. As the leader of the game, the assembler is able
to optimally change the prices offered to the suppliers such that the equilibrium production
quantity (Q̃∗) changes optimally for her. Hence, the assembler is always better off when any
two random variables in (K1, ..., Kn, D) become more positively correlated.
Table 1.4: n = 2, (µ1, µ2, µD) = (500, 500, 600), (σ1, σ2, σD) = (180, 180, 30), ρ1D = ρ2D =
0, p− c0 = 5112, c1 = 100, s1 = 66, c2 = 150, s2 = 80
ρ12 Q̃
∗ w∗1 w
∗
2 Π
∗
0 Π
∗
1 Π
∗
2 Π
∗
D
-0.99 412.50 212.58 334.83 1552120 33426 54878 1640423
-0.96 412.51 212.59 334.86 1552124 33431 54886 1640440
-0.9 413.13 213.38 336.10 1552539 33699 55314 1641552
-0.5 430.39 226.52 355.55 1578571 38522 62522 1679615
0 458.30 240.16 373.36 1643060 44550 70850 1758460
0.5 490.76 251.46 386.12 1742330 51100 79478 1872908
0.9 524.17 254.91 386.10 1886973 56338 85744 2029055
0.96 530.80 252.41 381.03 1930979 56511 85586 2073076
0.99 535.50 249.41 375.49 1968850 56278 84907 2110035
On the contrary, the suppliers may be better or worse off as verified by our numerical
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experiments. In Table 1.4, we report the equilibrium results of a randomly generated nu-
merical example. In this example, as the correlation coefficient between K1 and K2 (ρ12)
increases from −0.99 to 0.99, we observe that the equilibrium production quantity (Q̃∗) and
the assembler’s profit always increase, but the prices and profits for both suppliers could
either increase or decrease. This result can be explained as follows. When ρ12 increases,
M increases. Therefore, even if the assembler does not pay each supplier a higher price,
the suppliers still have a tendency to produce more in equilibrium because under the con-
signment contract, each suppliers are only paid for the quantity sold to the market which
is min(M, Q̃∗). Hence, the assembler does not necessarily need to offer higher prices to the
suppliers to induce a higher production quantity. Since each supplier may obtain a higher
or lower price from the assembler, the suppliers’ profits might increase or decrease.
1.5.5 Random Capacity vs. Reliable Supply
In this study, random capacities are the key factors influencing every member’s strategy
and profit in equilibrium. Note that Gerchak and Wang (2004) analyze a model under
the revenue-sharing contract which is similar to our model under the VMCI contract, and
the only difference is that they assume all suppliers are perfectly reliable and the suppliers
do not have any capacity constraints. By comparing our results under random supply ca-
pacities with their results under reliable supplies, we can investigate the impact of supply
uncertainties on the system performance as well as each individual firm’s profitability.
Following the similar algebra procedure, we can derive Q̃r∗i , w
r∗
i ,Π
r∗
i ,Π
r∗
0 , and Π
r∗
D which
denote the equilibrium production quantity and unit price for supplier i, and the respective
equilibrium profits for supplier i, the assembler, and the system under reliable supplies. It
is straightforward to show the following results: the assembler will choose a pricing scheme
(wr∗1 , ..., w
r∗
n ) such that w
r∗
i = si +
ci−si
F̄D(Q̃r∗)
,∀i = 1, ..., n, to induce the same production
quantity, namely Q̃r∗, from all suppliers; then if fD(Q)
[F̄D(Q)]2
∫ Q
0
F̄D(x)dx is increasing in Q, there
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exists a unique solution Q̃r∗ to the suppliers’ problem that satisfies
[p− c0 −
n∑
i=1
si]F̄D(Q̃
r∗)−
n∑
i=1
(ci − si)[1 +
fD(Q̃
r∗)
[F̄D(Q̃r∗)]2
∫ Q̃r∗
0
F̄D(x)dx] = 0.
As noted in Gerchak and Wang (2004), the assumption (i.e., fD(Q)
[F̄D(Q)]2
∫ Q
0
F̄D(x)dx is in-
creasing in Q) is very weak, and any demand distribution with IFR satisfies this assumption.
In conjunction with Lemma 1.4 and Proposition 1.3, we compare Π∗0 and Π
r∗
0 to establish
the following Proposition.
Proposition 1.8. Π∗0 < Π
r∗
0 .
Proposition 1.8 indicates that the assembler’s expected profit under random capacities is
strictly less than her expected profit under reliable supplies.
Table 1.5: n = 2, p− c0 = 254, c1 = 30, s1 = 28, c2 = 45, s2 = 20, D ∼ Exp(0.008),
under random capacity: K1 ∼ Exp(0.004), K2 ∼ Exp(0.003), (D,K1, K2) are mutually in-
dependent.
Q̃r∗, Q̃∗ wr∗1 , w
∗
1 w
r∗
2 , w
∗
2 Π
r∗
0 ,Π
∗
0 Π
r∗
1 ,Π
∗
1 Π
r∗
2 ,Π
∗
2 Π
r∗
D ,Π
∗
D
Reliable Supply 128.59 33.52 89.05 10610.9 188.87 2360.81 13160.6
Random Capacity 55.28 44.31 83.39 4779.06 356.8 927.85 6063.71
When the suppliers are perfectly reliable, all suppliers are able to deliver the same quan-
tity in equilibrium. With random capacities, the suppliers cannot always deliver the same
quantity although their planned production quantities are identical in equilibrium. Hence,
there exists additional efficiency loss due to mismatched components in the assembly sys-
tem. As a result, the assembler, as the leader of the game, is always worse off with supply
uncertainties.
Interestingly, we find that the suppliers may sometimes be better off with random ca-
pacities, as illustrated by our numerical example in Table 1.5. In the presence of random
capacities, the suppliers tend to be more conservative on their production decisions thus
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might potentially reduce the final product sales quantity. As the follower of the game, the
supplier may use her random capacity as a leverage to negotiate with the assembler. Hence,
the assembler might need to offer a higher unit price to the supplier to induce a larger pro-
duction quantity. Consequently, the supplier with certain cost/risk structures might obtain
a higher profit.
1.6 Wholesale Price Contract
In this section, we apply the traditional wholesale price contract in this decentralized as-
sembly supply chain. As in Gerchak and Wang (2004), we assume that under the wholesale
price contract, the assembler bears the inventory risks, and the suppliers are the game lead-
ers while the assembler is the follower. That is, the component suppliers first offer their own
wholesale prices wi, i = 1, . . . , n, to the assembler simultaneously, then the assembler decides
the production quantity for each supplier, i.e., Qi for supplier i, i = 1, ..., n. After the ran-
dom capacities Ki, i = 1, ..., n are realized, supplier i delivers min(Qi, Ki) to the assembler
and receives wi for each unit delivered. After the demand D is realized, the assembler as-
sembles the available components and sells mini=1,...,n(Qi, Ki, D) to the market. The leftover
components, if any, are salvaged by the assembler at $si/unit for component i, i = 1, ..., n.
Based on the backward induction, we first solve the assembler’s problem and then solve the
suppliers’ problem.
Assembler’s Problem
Given any prices (w1, . . . , wn) offered by the suppliers, the assembler’s problem is to
choose (Q1, ..., Qn) to maximize her expected profit below
Π0 = E{(p− c0) min
i=1,...,n
(Qi,M)−
n∑
i=1
wi min(Qi, Ki) +
n∑
j=1
sj[min(Qj, Kj)− min
i=1,...,n
(Qi,M)]
+},
(1.13)
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where the first term is the assembler’s revenue from the final product market, the second
term is her payments to the suppliers, and the last term is her revenue from salvaging the
leftover components.
Suppose, WLOG, supplier k receives the lowest order quantity from the assembler,
i.e., Qk = min(Q1, ..., Qn). Since M = min(K1, ..., Kn, D) ≤ Ki and for all j = 1, ..., n,
min(Qj, Kj) ≥ min(Qk,M) always holds, the assembler’s expected profit function can be
reduced to
Π0(Q1, ..., Qn|Qk = min(Q1, ..., Qn)) = E{(p− c0 −
n∑
i=1
si) min(Qk,M)−
n∑
i=1
[(wi − si) min(Qi, Ki)]}
Therefore, it is best for the assembler to order the same quantity from all suppliers because
wi > si for all the components. Define Q1 = ... = Qn = Q˜ . We obtain the following result.
Proposition 1.9. Π0 is quasi-concave in Q˜ and has a unique solution Q˜ ∗ to the assembler’s
problem which is determined by the first-order condition
(p− c0 −
n∑
i=1
si)F̄M(Q˜ ∗) =
n∑
i=1
(wi − si)F̄i(Q˜ ∗). (1.14)
Suppliers’ Problem
Anticipating an identical order quantity of Q˜ ∗ from the assembler, the suppliers simul-
taneously decide their respective wholesale prices to maximize their own expected profits.
Specifically, for any wholesale prices chosen by the other n−1 suppliers, supplier i’s problem
can be written as
max Πi(wi|wj, j 6= i) = E{wi min(Q˜ ∗, Ki)− ciQ˜ ∗}. (1.15)
Following the same procedure in section 1.4.2, we can establish a one-to-one relationship
between Q˜ ∗ and wi for any given wholesale prices chosen by the other suppliers. Hence, we
can equivalently optimize supplier i’s expected profit Πi over Q˜ ∗ instead of wi. For notational
26
convenience, let L(Q)
def
=
[∑n
i=1(ci − siF̄i(Q))− (p− c0 −
∑n
i=1 si)F̄M(Q)
]
/
∑n
i=1
∫Q
0 F̄i(x)dx
F̄i(Q)
,∀Q.
After solving each supplier’s best response, we are able to obtain the N.E. for this game,
formally presented in the following Proposition:
Proposition 1.10. There exists a pure-strategy N.E. for the game. The suppliers’ equilib-
rium prices are
w∗i (Q˜ ∗) = 1F̄i(Q˜ ∗) [ci − L(Q˜
∗)
∫ Q˜∗0 F̄i(x)dx
F̄i(Q˜ ∗) ], ∀i = 1, ...n,
where the assembler’s equilibrium order quantity Q˜ ∗ can be determined by solving
n∑
i=1
fi(Q˜ ∗)
F̄i(Q˜ ∗)(ci−siF̄i(Q˜
∗))−fM(Q˜ ∗)(p−c0−
n∑
i=1
si)−L(Q˜ ∗)
n∑
i=1
fi(Q˜ ∗) ∫ Q˜
∗
0 F̄i(x)dx
[F̄i(Q˜ ∗)]2 −L(Q˜
∗) = 0.
(1.16)
Although we could not prove the uniqueness of Q˜ ∗, our result is still one step further than
the result obtained in Gerchak and Wang (2004) since under the wholesale price contract,
they only obtain the equation for the equilibrium quantity Q, i.e., (24) in their paper, for a
special case in which all suppliers are identical. Under the same assumption, we are able to
prove the uniqueness of Q˜ ∗ as well.
1.7 VMCI vs. Wholesale Price
Finally, we compare the VMCI contract with the wholesale price contract in this section.
Using the centralized system as the baseline, we first compare the system performance un-
der the VMCI contract with that under the wholesale price contract. We use Mathematica
11.2 to conduct an extensive numerical experiment based on 2000 randomly generated data
sets. The model parameters are randomly generated as follows: n = 2, D ∼ Exp(λ0), K1 ∼
Exp(λ1), K2 ∼ Exp(λ2), (λ0, λ1, λ2) ∼ Uniform[0.001, 0.01], D,K1, K2 are mutually inde-
pendent, (c1, c2) ∼ Uniform[30, 50], (s1, s2) ∼ Uniform[10,29], (p− c0) ∼ Uniform[200, 300].
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All our results (from 2000 simulations) consistently indicate that the equilibrium pro-
duction quantity under the wholesale price is lower than that under the VMCI contract,
which is strictly lower than the optimal centralized production quantity. Due to the double-
marginalization effect, the assembler/suppliers in a decentralized system become more con-
servative, i.e., they would plan an equilibrium production quantity strictly lower than the
optimal centralized production quantity. As a result, there always exists efficiency loss in
the decentralized system. Recall that under the VMCI contract, the assembler is the game
leader and the suppliers bear all the inventory overstocking risks, whereas under a wholesale
price contract, the assembler is the game follower and the assembler bears the inventory
risks. Hence, under the VMCI contract, the assembler tends to induce a higher production
quantity in equilibrium.
To distinguish between the two contracts, we now use Π∗W and Π
∗
V to denote the respective
decentralized system profits under the wholesale-price contract and the VMCI contract.
Since the centralized system profit function is strictly concave in the production quantity
(as demonstrated in Proposition 1.1), Π∗W < Π
∗
V < Π
∗
C always holds, as shown in Figure
1.2. To enhance the clarity of Figure 1.2, we sort the results from the 2000 iterations by the
centralized system profits in ascending order. Figure 1.2 indicates that the VMCI contract is
more efficient than the wholesale price contract for the supply chain. This result is consistent
with the results from the supply chain contracting literature including Gerchak and Wang
(2004), Granot and Yin (2008), and others. We also observe that the decentralized system
efficiencies under the wholesale price contract are about 40-70% whereas the decentralized
system efficiencies under the VMCI contract are about 50-80%.
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Figure 1.2: System profits comparison
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Figure 1.3: Assembler’s optimal profit comparison
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Our results also remark that the assembler is more profitable under the VMCI contract
(see Figure 1.3) whereas the suppliers would earn a higher profit under the wholesale price
contract (see Figure 1.4). Such observations can be explained by the first-mover advantage
since the assembler is the game leader under the VMCI contract while the suppliers are the
game leaders under the wholesale price contract.
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Figure 1.4: Suppliers’ profits comparison under two contracts.
(a) Supplier 1’s optimal profit comparison
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(b) Supplier 2’s optimal profit comparison
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1.8 Conclusion
We studied a decentralized assembly supply chain with an assembler and n component
suppliers each producing a different component. Due to exogenous factors, each supplier’s
capacity is uncertain such that only the lesser of planned production quantity and actual
realized capacity can be delivered to the assembler. In the first part of the chapter, we
focused on the VMCI contract. Under the VMCI arrangement, the assembler offers a unit
price to each supplier who subsequently decides the production plan. After the demand is
realized, the assembly process begins and the suppliers are paid by the assembler for their
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used components only. Unused components, if any, are salvaged by each supplier. Using
a game-theoretic framework, we derived the equilibrium solution for this problem. Our
results revealed several interesting insights for the decentralized assembly system with supply
uncertainties. Our analysis illustrated that while a reduction in one supplier’s component
cost, capacity uncertainty, or an increase on the component salvage value would improve
the assembler’s and other suppliers’ profitability, it does not necessarily benefit this specific
supplier. Hence, it is critical for the assembler to offer proper incentives to induce the
suppliers to reduce their costs or capacity uncertainties, and to increase their salvage values.
In addition, we showed that when the suppliers’ random capacities become more positively
correlated, it always benefits the assembler but not necessarily the suppliers.
Since simple wholesale price contracts are often used in practice and discussed in the
literature, we analyzed a wholesale price contract in the second part of the chapter. Under
the wholesale price contract, the suppliers are the leaders of the game, and the assembler
is the follower. That is, the suppliers first decide their respective wholesale prices, then the
assembler decides the order quantities. After obtaining the analytical equilibrium solution
for the wholesale price contract, we were able to compare the wholesale price contract with
the VMCI contract. First, we found that the assembler prefers the VMCI contract and
the suppliers prefer the wholesale price contract, which can be explained by the first-mover
advantage. Second, by comparing the decentralized system profit under the VMCI or the
wholesale price contracts with the centralized system profit, we revealed that the VMCI
contract is more efficient than the wholesale price contract for the entire supply chain.
This result further confirms that the prior result in the decentralized assembly supply chain
literature (see, e.g., Gerchak and Wang 2004, Grant and Yin 2008) still holds when the
component suppliers have random capacity constraints.
There are several limitations of our model. First of all, our study, similar to many other
related papers, assumed that each of the random demand and random capacities follows
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a continuous probability distribution for the derivation simplicity. However, in many real
operations environments, it is important to precisely use discrete distributions to describe
D,Ki, and Q, especially for those critical products which only come in small discrete quan-
tities. Hence, future studies may adopt discrete distributions to represent a more realistic
case. It will also be worthy to study a scenario with both supply disruption and random
capacity. That is, there is a discrete probability under which a supplier cannot deliver any
component due to disruptive events, and if the supplier’s production is not disrupted in the
very beginning, the production capacity is a random variable following a continuous distribu-
tion. Second, we assumed that each component is provided by a single supplier. One might
also consider dual-sourcing or multi-sourcing for the same component to examine whether
the horizontal competition could mitigate the supply risk and improve the supply chain effi-
ciency. The model used in Jiang and Wang (2010) might be helpful in this direction. Third,
we assumed that there is only one final assembled product. In a general assembly system,
same components may be used in several final products. Therefore, it might be fruitful to
follow the model in Bernstein et al. (2007) to analyze how supply uncertainties could affect
the performance of a multi-product assembly system. Finally, in our model we assumed all
the suppliers and the assembler are independent. One might extend our work to allow the
suppliers and the assembler to form coalitions, as in Granot and Yin (2008), to reduce the
supply chain risk due to supply uncertainties.
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1.A Appendix
Proof. Lemma 1.1. In the centralized system, without loss of generality, suppose that Qk =
min
i=1,...,n
Qi. The component k can be referred as the “bottleneck”. Since min, [ ]
+, and the
composition of such functions are Lipschitz functions, the expectation and the derivatives
can be interchanged (Glasserman, 1994), i.e., ∂EΠ
∂Q
= E[ ∂Π
∂Q
]. Taking the differentiation of ΠC
w.r.t. Qk, we obtain
∂ΠC
∂Qk
= (p− c0)Pr(M ≥ Qk)− ck −
n∑
i=1,i 6=k
siPr(M ≥ Qk)+
skPr(Qk ≤ Kk)Pr(min(Qk, K1, ..., Kk−1, Kk+1, ..., Kn, D) 6= Qk | Qk ≤ Kk)
= (p− c0)F̄M(Qk)− ck − F̄M(Qk)
n∑
i=1,i 6=k
si + sk(F̄k(Qk)− F̄M(Qk))
= (p− c0 −
n∑
i=1
si)F̄M(Qk)− ck + skF̄k(Qk).
(1.A.1)
F̄M(·) and F̄i(·), i = 1, ..., n, are decreasing functions, therefore ΠC is strictly concave.
For any other component i, i 6= k, direct differentiation of ΠC w.r.t. Qi yields that
∂ΠC
∂Qi
= −ci + siF̄i(Qi) < 0
Since ΠC is strictly decreasing in Qi, the central planner will choose the same production
quantity for all components to match with Qk, i.e., Q1 = . . . = Qk = . . . = Qn.
Proof. Proposition 1.1. The proof is embedded in the main body of the chapter, hence we
do not repeat it here.
Proof. Lemma 1.2. The proof is embedded in the main body of the chapter, hence we do
not repeat it here.
Proof. Lemma 1.3. Recall that Q̃i is the solution to (5). From
∂ΠIi (Qi)
∂Qi
, it can be easily
derived that
∂2ΠIi
∂Qi∂wi
= F̄M(Qi) > 0, and,
∂2ΠIi
∂Q2i
= −fM(Qi)(wi − si) − sifi(Qi) < 0. Hence,
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∂Q̃i(wi)
∂wi
= − ∂
2ΠIi
∂Qi∂wi
/
∂2ΠIi
∂Q2i
> 0, that is, Q̃i(wi) is increasing in wi.
Proof. Proposition 1.2. Solving the n best response functions given by (1.6) simultaneously,
it is straightforward to show that Q∗1 = ... = Q
∗
n ≤ Q̃ is a N.E. for the suppliers’ problem.
Because ΠIi (Qi|Q−i) is increasing in Qi for all Qi ≤ Q̃, Q∗1 = ... = Q∗n = Q̃ is the unique
Pareto-optimal N.E.
Proof. Lemma 1.4. Without loss of generality, suppose Q̃1(w
∗
1) < Q̃2(w
∗
2) < . . . < Q̃n(w
∗
n).
Thus, min{Q̃1(w∗1), Q̃2(w∗2), ..., Q̃n(w∗n)} = Q̃1(w∗1). Recall from Lemma 1.3 that Q̃i, i =
1, . . . , n, is an increasing function in wi. Then, for any i = 2, ..., n, there exists a w̄i < w
∗
i
such that Q̃1(w
∗
1) = Q̃i(w̄i) < Q̃i(w
∗
i ). Therefore,
min{Q̃1(w∗1), Q̃2(w∗2), ..., Q̃n(w∗n)} = min{Q̃1(w∗1), Q̃2(w̄2), ..., Q̃n(w̄n)} = Q̃1(w∗1).
By offering such a pricing scheme (w∗1, w̄2, ..., w̄n), the assembler’s expected profit becomes
Π0(w
∗
1, w̄2, ..., w̄n) = (p− c0 − w∗1 −
n∑
i=2
w̄i)E[ min
i=1,...,n
(Q̃1(w
∗
1),M)].
Since w∗1 +
∑n
i=2 w̄i <
∑n
i=1 w
∗
i , Π0(w
∗
1, w̄2, ..., w̄n) > Π0(w
∗
1, w
∗
2, ..., w
∗
n) which results in con-
tradiction against the optimality. Therefore, the optimal pricing scheme should be designed
such that
Q̃1(w
∗
1) = Q̃2(w
∗
2) = ... = Q̃n(w
∗
n) = Q̃. (1.A.2)
Building upon such one-to-one relationship between Q̃ and each w∗i , i = 1, . . . , n, we can
express each w∗i as a function of Q̃ by transforming equation (1.5).
Proof. Proposition 1.3. Direct differentiation of (1.9) gives
dΠ0
dQ̃
= −
n∑
i=1
4′i(Q̃)S(Q̃) + (p− c0 −
n∑
i=1
si −
n∑
i=1
4i(Q̃))F̄M(Q̃) = 0, (1.A.3)
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and
d2Π0
dQ̃2
= −
n∑
i=1
4′′i (Q̃)S(Q̃)− 2
n∑
i=1
4′i(Q̃)F̄M(Q̃)− (p− c0 −
n∑
i=1
si −
n∑
i=1
4i(Q̃))fM(Q̃)).
Similar to Theorem 2 in Cachon and Lariviere (2001), an obvious condition for ensuring
a concave profit function of the assembler is that
∑n
i=14′′i (Q̃) ≥ 0. Checking the first
derivative of 4i(Q̃), we have
4′i(Q̃) =
sifi(Q̃)
F̄M(Q̃)
+
(ci − siF̄i(Q̃))fM(Q̃)
(F̄M(Q̃))2
= si
fi(Q̃)
F̄i(Q̃)
F̄i(Q̃)
F̄M(Q̃)
+4i(Q̃)
fM(Q̃)
F̄M(Q̃)
As a result of the IFR property and increasing F̄i(Q̃)
F̄M (Q̃)
, 4′i(Q̃) is increasing in Q̃. At Q̃ = 0,
dΠ0
dQ̃
= p −
∑n
i=0 ci. In conjunction with the concavity of Π0, there must exist a unique
solution, namely Q̃∗, to equation (1.A.3).
Proof. Proposition 1.4. (i) Since Q̃∗ is obtained from solving dΠ0
dQ̃
= 0, ∂Q̃
∗
∂ci
= − ∂2Π0
∂Q̃∂ci
/∂
2Π0
∂Q̃2
.
From equation (1.A.3), we can derive that
∂2Π0
∂Q̃∂ci
= −S(Q̃)
n∑
j=1
∂4′j(Q̃)
∂cj
− F̄M(Q̃)
n∑
j=1
∂4j(Q̃)
∂cj
= −S(Q̃)∂4
′
i(Q̃)
∂ci
− F̄M(Q̃)
∂4i(Q̃)
∂ci
= −S(Q̃)fM(Q̃)
[F̄M(Q̃)]2
− 1 < 0,
In conjunction with the property of a concave Π0,
∂Q̃∗
∂ci
< 0.
(ii) For supplier j, ∀j 6= i, since wj(Q̃∗) is independent of ci, the result follows directly
from
dw∗j
dci
=
∂4∗j
∂Q̃∗
∂Q̃∗
∂ci
< 0.
For supplier i, we first substitute 4′i(Q̃) into the first order condition from Proposition
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1.3, and expand the function such that
−
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
4′j(Q̃∗)S(Q̃∗)−
sifi(Q̃
∗)
F̄M(Q̃∗)
S(Q̃∗)−4i(Q̃∗)S(Q̃∗)
fM(Q̃
∗)
F̄M(Q̃∗)
+ (p− c0 −
n∑
i=1
si −
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
4j(Q̃∗))F̄M(Q̃∗)−4i(Q̃∗)F̄M(Q̃∗) = 0,
where h0(·)
def
= g(·)
Ḡ(·) and hi(·)
def
= fi(·)
F̄i(·)
, i = 1, ..., n for notational convenience. It implies that
the optimal quantity Q̃∗ satisfies
4i(Q̃∗) =
(p− c0 −
∑n
i=1 si −
∑n
j=1,j 6=i4j(Q̃∗))F̄M(Q̃∗)−
∑n
j=1,j 6=i4′j(Q̃∗)S(Q̃∗)−
sifi(Q̃
∗)
F̄M (Q̃∗)
S(Q̃∗)∑n
i=0 hi(Q̃
∗)S(Q̃∗) + F̄M(Q̃∗)
,
following which wi(Q̃
∗) = si +4i(Q̃∗) is independent of ci. Together with the IFR property,
we recognize that the right-hand side of the above function decreases in Q̃∗, i.e.,
∂4∗i
∂Q̃∗
< 0.
Hence,
dw∗i
dci
≡ d4
∗
i
dci
=
∂4∗i
∂Q̃∗
∂Q̃∗
∂ci
> 0.
(iii) For analyzing the assembler’s expected profit, suppose ci decreases to ĉi under which
the optimal quantity and the assembler’s profit function are denoted by ˆ̃Q∗ and Π̂0, respec-
tively. Due to ci > ĉi, it follows from (9) that Π0(Q̃
∗) < Π̂0(Q̃
∗). Since ˆ̃Q∗ is the optimal
solution to maximizing Π̂0, Π0(Q̃
∗) < Π̂0(Q̃
∗) < Π̂0(
ˆ̃Q∗), which implies that Π∗0 decreases in
ci.
Given the optimal quantity Q̃∗, the decentralized system profit, Π∗D, is written as
Π∗D = (p− c0)E[ min
i=1,...,n
(Q̃∗,M)]−
n∑
i=1
ciQ̃
∗ +
n∑
i=1
siE[min(Q̃
∗, Ki)− min
j=1,...,n
(Q̃∗,M)]+(1.A.4)
Direct differentiation of Π∗D w.r.t. ci yields
dΠ∗D
dci
= [p− c0 −
n∑
i=1
si −
n∑
i=1
4i(Q̃∗)]F̄M(Q̃∗)
∂Q̃∗
∂ci
− Q̃∗ < 0.
For supplier j, ∀j 6= i, substituting (1.8) into Πj provides
Π∗j = (sj +4j(Q̃∗))E[ min
i=1,...,n
(Q̃∗, Ki, D)]− cjQ̃∗ + sjE[min(Q̃∗, Kj)− min
i=1,...,n
(Q̃∗, Ki, D)]
+,
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which is independent of ci. Then differentiation of Π
∗
j w.r.t. ci yields
dΠ∗j
dci
=
∂Π∗j
∂Q̃∗
∂Q̃∗
∂ci
. Together
with
∂Π∗j
∂Q̃∗
=
(
sjfj(Q̃
∗)
F̄M (Q̃∗)
+
(cj−sj F̄j(Q̃∗))fM (Q̃∗)
F̄M (Q̃∗)2
)
S(Q̃∗) > 0, the result follows from part (i).
Proof. Proposition 1.5. (i) Following (1.A.3), it can be derived that
∂2Π0
∂Q̃∂si
=
F̄i(Q̃)S(Q̃)
F̄M(Q̃)
(
fM(Q̃)
F̄M(Q̃)
− fi(Q̃)
F̄i(Q̃)
)
+ F̄i(Q̃)− F̄M(Q̃) > 0.
Hence, we obtain that ∂Q̃
∗
∂si
= − ∂2Π0
∂Q̃∂si
/∂
2Π0
∂Q̃2
> 0.
For supplier j, ∀j 6= i, since wj(Q̃∗) is independent of si, the result follows directly from
dw∗j
dsi
=
∂4∗j
∂Q̃∗
∂Q̃∗
∂si
> 0.
(ii) Suppose the parameter si increases to ŝi under which the corresponding optimal
quantity and the assembler’s optimal expected profit are denoted by ˆ̃Q∗ and Π̂0. From (1.9),
it follows that Π0(Q̃
∗) < Π̂0(Q̃
∗). Since ˆ̃Q∗ is the optimal solution for the system with
parameter ŝi, Π0(Q̃
∗) < Π̂0(Q̃
∗) < Π̂0(
ˆ̃Q∗), i.e., the assembler’s expected profit increases in
si. Direct differentiation of Π
∗
D w.r.t. si yields that
dΠ∗D
dsi
=
∂Π∗D
∂Q̃∗
∂Q̃∗
∂si
+ E[min(Q̃∗, Ki)− min
j=1,...,n
(Q̃∗,M)]+ > 0.
Furthermore, since the expected profit for supplier j, j 6= i, is not affected by si and
increasing on Q̃∗. It directly follows from part (i) that Π∗j increases as si increases.
Proof. Proposition 1.6. (i) Applying the same method as in the proof of Proposition 4, it is
straightforward to obtain ∂Q̃
∗
∂p
= − ∂2Π0
∂Q̃∂p
/∂
2Π0
∂Q̃2
> 0. Since wi(Q̃
∗), i = 1, . . . , n, is not affected
by p, the result follows directly.
(ii) Since Πj(Q̃
∗), ∀j = 1, . . . , n is independent of p, the result follows directly from (i).
For the assembler’s profit, the proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 1.5(i) and
thus omitted here. As a consequence of increasing Π∗0 and Π
∗
j ,∀j = 1, . . . , n, the total system
profit increases as well.
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The analysis for the impact of decreasing c0 on the system is analogous to above, thus
we omit the details here.
Proof. Proposition 1.7. Let Y
def
= (K1, ..., Kn, D), Y
L = (KL1 , ..., K
L
n , D
L) ∼ N(µ,Σ) and
YH = (KH1 , ..., K
H
n , D
H) ∼ N(µ′,Σ′). Assume µ = µ′, σab ≤ σ′ab for some a 6= b; a, b =
1, ..., n + 1 and σij = σ
′
ij,∀(i, j) /∈ {(a, b), (b, a)}. Then, following Theorem 4.2 of Müller
and Scarsini (2000), we have Y L ≤sm Y H , i.e., Y L is smaller than Y H in the supermodular
order which implies that Ef(Y L) ≤ Ef(Y H) for all supermodular functions f such that the
expectations exist by Definition 2.3 of Müller and Scarsini (2000). It follows from Example
2.6.2 (f) on page 46 of Topkis (1998) that function min(K1, ..., Kn, D) is a supermodular
function in (K1, ..., Kn, D). Therefore, we have S(Q̃|Y L) ≤ S(Q̃|Y H), ∀Q̃ since S(Q̃)
(1.10)
=
E[min(Q̃,M)] = E[min(Q̃,K1, ..., Kn, D)]. Definition 2.4 and remarks on page 110 of Müller
and Scarsini (2000) immediately imply that Y L ≤uo Y H , i.e., F̄Y L(t) ≤ F̄Y H (t), ∀t ∈ Rn+1.
Let t = (t, ..., t) ∈ Rn+1, ∀t ∈ R, then we have Pr(KL1 > t, ...,KLn > t,DL > t) ≤ Pr(KH1 >
t, ...,KHn > t,D
H > t) which implies that Pr(min(KL1 , ..., K
L
n , D
L) > t) = F̄M(t|Y L) ≤
Pr(min(KH1 , ..., K
H
n , D
H) > t) = F̄M(t|Y H) due to M = min(K1, ...Kn, D). In conjunc-
tion with (1.11), we have ∆i(Q̃|Y L) ≥ ∆i(Q̃|Y H),∀Q̃, i = 1, ..., n. Let Q̃∗i, i = L,H de-
note the optimal Q̃ which maximizes Π0(Q̃|Y i) in (1.9). Hence, we have Π0(Q̃∗H |Y H) ≥
Π0(Q̃
∗L|Y H) ≥ Π0(Q̃∗L|Y L).
Proof. Proposition 1.8. Recall that Π0(Q̃) = E[(p − c0 −
∑n
i=1 wi(Q̃)) min(Q̃,M)] and
Πr0(Q̃
r) = E[(p − c0 −
∑n
i=1 w
r
i (Q̃
r)) min(Q̃r, D)]. We first establish that
∑n
i=1wi(Q̃
∗) −∑n
i=1w
r
i (Q̃
∗) =
∑n
i=1
siFi(Q̃
∗)
F̄M (Q̃∗)
+
∑n
i=1
ci−si
F̄M (Q̃∗)
−
∑n
i=1
ci−si
F̄D(Q̃∗)
. Since F̄D(Q̃
∗) − F̄M(Q̃∗) =
Pr(D > Q̃∗) − Pr(M > Q̃∗) = Pr(D > Q̃∗) − Pr(K1 > Q̃∗, ..., Kn > Q̃∗|D > Q̃∗)Pr(D >
Q̃∗) > 0,
∑n
i=1wi(Q̃
∗) >
∑n
i=1w
r
i (Q̃
∗). In conjunction with min(Q̃∗,M) ≤ min(Q̃∗, D), we
have Π∗0(Q̃
∗) < Πr0(Q̃
∗). Since Q̃r∗ is the optimal solution to maximizing Πr0, it follows that
Π∗0(Q̃
∗) < Πr0(Q̃
∗) < Πr∗0 (Q̃
r∗).
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Proof. Proposition 1.9. Taking the derivative of Π0(Q˜) w.r.t. Q˜ , we obtain
∂Π0(Q˜)
∂Q˜ = F̄M(Q˜)
[
(p− c0 −
n∑
i=1
si)−
n∑
i=1
(wi − si)F̄i(Q˜)
F̄M(Q˜)
]
.
It follows from the assumption (A2), there exists a unique solution, namely Q˜ ∗ ∈ [0,∞), to
the assembler’s problem (1.13) that is uniquely determined by
∂Π0(Q˜)∂Q˜ |Q˜=Q˜∗= 0.
Proof. Proposition 1.10. Given any wholesale prices wj, j 6= i, offered by all other suppliers,
supplier i will set his wholesale price wi according to
∂Π0(Q˜)∂Q˜ |Q˜=Q˜∗= 0 such that
wi = si +
1
F̄i(Q˜ ∗) [F̄M(Q˜
∗)(p− c0 −
n∑
i=1
si)−
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
(wj − si)F̄j(Q˜ ∗)] (1.A.5)
Following Proposition 1.9, we can derive
∂Q˜∗∂wi = −∂2Π0/∂Q˜∂wi∂2Π0/∂Q˜2 =
F̄i(Q˜)∂2Π0/∂Q˜2 < 0, and
∂2Q˜∗∂w2i =
−
F̄i(Q˜)fi(Q˜)(∂2Π0/∂Q˜2)2 < 0. That is, Q˜ ∗(wi) is decreasing concave in wi,∀i = 1, . . . , n. It then follows
that the inverse function wi(Q˜ ∗) is decreasing and concave in Q˜ ∗. Based on the one-to-one
relationship between wi and Q˜ ∗, we can equivalently optimize supplier i’s expected profit
Πi over Q˜ instead of wi. Substituting (1.A.5) into problem (1.15) and checking the second
derivative w.r.t. Q˜ , we have
∂2Πi(Q˜)
∂Q˜ 2 = 2
∂wi(Q˜)
∂Q˜ F̄i(Q˜) +
∂2wi(Q˜)
∂Q˜ 2
∫ Q˜
0
F̄i(x)dx− wi(Q˜)fi(Q˜) < 0.
That is, Πi(Q˜) is continuous and concave with respect to supplier i’s own strategy. Moreover,
each wi is strictly constrained to be in [ci, p − c0] so that each supplier’s strategy space is
compact and convex. Therefore, there exists a pure-strategy N.E. for the game (Debreu,
1952).
45
Substituting (1.A.5) into (1.15) then taking derivative w.r.t. Q˜ , we have
∂Πi(Q˜)
∂Q˜
=
∫ Q˜
0
F̄i(x)dx{
fi(Q˜)
[F̄i(Q˜)]2
[F̄M(Q˜)(p− c0 −
n∑
i=1
si)−
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
(wj − sj)F̄j(Q˜)]
+
1
F̄i(Q˜)
[−fM(Q˜)(p− c0 −
n∑
i=1
si) +
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
(wj − sj)fj(Q˜)]}
+ siF̄i(Q˜) + F̄M(Q˜)(p− c0 −
n∑
i=1
si)−
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
(wj − sj)F̄j(Q˜)− ci,
(1.A.6)
in which all other wj, j 6= i, are embedded.
For any other supplier j, j 6= i, direct differentiation of Πj(wj) (i.e., problem (1.15))
w.r.t. wj yields
∂Πj(wj)
∂wj
=
∫ Q˜∗
0
F̄j(x)dx+ (wjF̄j(Q˜ ∗)− cj)
∂Q˜ ∗
∂wj
, (1.A.7)
and
∂2Πj(wj)
∂w2j
= F̄j(Q˜ ∗)
∂Q˜ ∗
∂wj
− wjfj(Q˜ ∗)(
∂Q˜ ∗
∂wj
)2 + (wjF̄j(Q˜ ∗)− cj)
∂2Q˜ ∗
∂w2j
.
The first-order condition (1.A.7) should be discussed in two cases: (1) wjF̄j(Q˜ ∗)−cj ≥ 0;
and (2) wjF̄j(Q˜ ∗)−cj < 0. If wjF̄j(Q˜ ∗)−cj ≥ 0 (referred as case 1), the first order condition
is non-monotonic and Πj is concave in wj. Then there is a unique optimal solution, namely
w∗j , to
∂Πj(wj)
∂wj
|wj=w∗j = 0. However, if wjF̄j(Q˜ ∗) − cj < 0 (referred as case 2), the first-order
condition is monotonically increasing in wj, implying that the optimal w
∗
j will be ∞ which
will lead to an order quantity of 0. Case 2 is clearly dominated by case 1 thus not in the
equilibrium. Therefore, the unique optimal solution w∗j is the solution to
∂Πj(wj)
∂wj
|wj=w∗j = 0,
satisfying w∗j F̄j(Q˜ ∗) = cj − ∂2Π0∂Q˜∗2
∫Q˜∗0 F̄j(x)dx
F̄j(Q˜∗) . Summing up all w∗j F̄j(Q˜ ∗), ∀j = 1, . . . , n, and
then subtracting equation (1.14), we can obtain an equivalent expression for ∂
2Π0
∂Q˜∗2 , which is
denoted by L(Q˜) and presented in the main body of the chapter. Subsequently, w∗j can now
become a function of Q˜ only, i.e., w∗j (Q˜) = 1F̄j(Q˜) [cj − L(Q˜)
∫Q
0̃ F̄j(x)dx
F̄j(Q˜) ].
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By substituting w∗j (Q˜) into (1.A.6) and setting it equal to 0, the equilibrium production
quantity Q˜ ∗ can be determined by solving equation (1.16).
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Chapter 2
Procurement Design for a National
Brand Supplier in the Presence of
Store Brand Competition
2.1 Introduction
Store brands, also known as private labels or generic brands, are a line of products branded
and managed solely by a retailer for sales. In recent years, having realized that store brands
are an efficient instrument to improve gross margin, many retailers have been gradually
shifting their emphasis to the development of store brands. Store brand products have been
steadily earning trust among consumers and are becoming recognized as good alternatives
to national brands. Achieving significant success in Europe, store brands hold market shares
of 40% or higher in seven countries, including UK, Germany, and Switzerland (Private La-
bel Manufacturers Association International, 2017). ACNielsen reported that in 2014, the
dollar shares of private label products had achieved 17.5% of the total sales revenue in the
U.S. Marchat (2018) stated that “during 2017, store brand sales across all outlets measured
by Nielsen came in at $122.3 billion, up from $119.1 billion, while units moved up to 44.6
billion from 43.9 billion.” Private Label Manufacturers Association (PLMA, 2018) further
commented that “since Nielsen’s statistics do not include some of the biggest and best store
brands retailers in the country, such as Costco, Aldi, and Trader Joe’s, estimates of their
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private label sales and other major operators not counted, such as Amazon, you can conser-
vatively add another $35 billion to private label sales for a total of $160 billion.” In addition,
unit sales of store brands in the mass channel increased by 9.1% in 2017 while unit volume
of national brands declined by 1%. Since retailers present a serious threat to national brand
suppliers by expanding their private labels, the rules of the game have changed. Retailers
who used to be simply a distribution channel for national brands have now also become
competitors to the national brand suppliers. The traditional advantages of national brands
are no longer as strong and are beginning to lose relevance. Hence, the national brands rec-
ognize the need to strategically defend against retailer brands (Alliance Consulting Group).
Since the recession ended, national brands have stepped up both promotional activity and
innovation efforts to protect share positions and drive growth (ACNielsen 2014). However,
precisely how a national brand supplier should adjust the supply contracting strategy to
cope with the rising store brand competition has not been completely addressed.
We first examine the various store brand supply structures. PLMA International Council
identifies three general categories of store brand manufacturers, which are (1) large manufac-
turers who produce their own brands and utilize the excess capacity to produce store brand
products, (2) smaller-size and regional manufacturers that specialize in particular product
lines and concentrate on producing store brands almost exclusively, (3) manufacturing facil-
ities run by major retailers and wholesalers to provide store brands for themselves and other
retail chains. (See PLMA International: Private Label Today). In the latter two cases, store
brands do not share the same manufacturing source with national brands. Given the poten-
tial competition with the national brand suppliers, the retailers do not have any incentive to
share the core information about store brand. Under such circumstances, a set of research
questions naturally arises: How should a national brand supplier design the supply contract?
What impact does the private information have on the supply chain participants? To our
best knowledge, such questions have not been fully answered in the literature.
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We consider a decentralized supply chain with a national brand supplier (she) and a
retailer (he). The national brand supplier distributes her products to consumers via the
retailer through a two-part tariff supply contract, which includes a unit wholesale price and
a lump-sum payment. Meanwhile, the retailer intends to develop and produce his own store
brand. Similar to Yano (2017), we assume that the retailer has a manufacturing source that
is different from the national brand supplier. The unit production cost of the store brand
is privately discovered by the retailer. The national brand supplier only has a subjective
assessment about the store brand production cost and believes that it has two possible
values, high type or low type. Given the supply contract offered by the national brand
supplier, the retailer can simultaneously decide whether to accept the supply contract and
whether to introduce the store brand. We show that if the wholesale price is low and the
lump-sum payment is lower than the threshold value, then the retailer will carry the national
brand only. When the wholesale price is in the medium range and the lump-sum payment
is lower than a certain threshold, then the retailer will carry both the national brand and
store brand. However, if the wholesale price is too high or the lump-sum payment is above
the threshold, then the retailer will prefer to carry the store brand only. Subsequently,
the retailer decides the retail price(s) for the carried product(s) to sell to the market. The
demand of the carried product(s) is determined by a quality-utility framework.
We first investigate a benchmark case assuming that the store brand cost information is
common knowledge to both members in the supply chain. In this case, the national brand
supplier will always offer a contract to achieve her first best profit and leave the retailer
nothing but his reservation profit. We then analyze the case in which the store brand unit
production cost is private information to the retailer only. Following the theory of incentives,
we formulate the problem as a two-stage screening game to analyze the strategic interaction
between the two players. The national brand supplier offers a menu of two contracts to the
retailer to maximize her expected profit and induce the retailer to truthfully reveal his store
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brand cost information. The national brand supplier’s contractual design problem presents
inherent complexity since there exists eight possible parameter settings, each representing a
distinct relationship among the national brand’s and store brand’s product characteristics
(i.e., cost and quality), and under each parameter setting there exists up to five possible
contract forms. Despite the computational complexity, we are able to derive the optimal
menu of contracts that maximizes the national brand supplier’s expected profit. We analyt-
ically demonstrate that the format of the optimal contract depends on the national brand
supplier’s own production cost. Moreover, we explore how the model parameters affect the
value of information for each member of the supply chain. We show that when the national
brand unit production cost increases, retailer’s private cost information becomes less valu-
able to both the national brand supplier and the retailer. Our results also indicate that
when the gap between the two possible cost values increases, the private cost information
becomes more valuable to the national brand supplier, but the value of information to the
retailer himself can increase or decrease. Finally, we illustrate that when the perceived qual-
ity of national brand increases, the value of information to the retailer first decreases then
increases, but the impact on the value of information to the national brand supplier is not
definitive. These observation are somewhat counter-intuitive and provide us with interesting
managerial insights.
The rest of the chapter precedes as follows. In section 2.2, we review the related lit-
erature. We then introduce the modeling framework in section 2.3. Section 2.4 solves the
retailer’s problem. In section 2.5, we analyze the supplier’s problem with complete informa-
tion as a benchmark case and also design the optimal menu of contracts under asymmetric
information. In section 2.6, we investigate the value of private information to both entities
and derive analytical results to illustrate the impact of model parameters. In section 2.7, we
will conclude the chapter with major results and further research directions.
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2.2 Literature Review
Our study stems from the store brand literature and a stream of asymmetric information
studies in operations management. The analytical research on store brands has been growing
since 1990s. Mills (1995) demonstrated that store brand can be leveraged to eliminate
double marginalization problem in the entire supply chain. Groznik and Heese (2010) studied
interaction between one supplier and one retailer and analyzed the impact of the store-brand
introduction on the supply chain. Wu and Wang (2005) investigated a more complicated
setting with two national brand manufacturers and one common retailer. Dhar and Hoch
(1997) conducted empirical analysis to investigate why the store brand performance varies
among major grocery retailers in the US. Sethuraman (2009) provided a comprehensive
summarization of the analytical results on the national brand and store brand marketing
as wells as the external validity of those results. Groznik, and Heese (2010) investigated
the interaction between retailers under the introduction of store brand. Yano et al. (2017)
studied a case in which a retailer, such as a major grocery chain, manufactures store brand
products in one’s own factory and faces a decision whether to sell the factory. Fang, et al.
(2013) investigated a two-stage Stackelberg game between national brand and store brand
and analyzed wholesale contract design under both centralized and decentralized systems.
To our best knowledge, no study has incorporated the private store brand cost information
in the interaction between the national brand supplier and the retailer.
In supply chain literature, the principle-agent model (Laffont and Martimort 2002) has
been utilized as a powerful instrument to cope with the information asymmetry. A principle
(he) offers contracts to an agent (her), who holds the private information, to extract informa-
tion revelation. The induction of private information is assured by setting up participation
constraints and incentive compatibility constraints on the agent’s profit. The participa-
tion constraints (also called individual rationality constraints) ensure the agent to at least
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achieve his reservation profit. The incentive constraints imply that the information rent will
be given up to the agent if his type is inefficient so that she will not mimic the efficient
type. Consequently, the incentive of conflict arising from cost information asymmetry will
be successfully eliminated, preventing the national brand supplier from over-discounting his
selling price (Fang 2012).
There was a large body of literature that applied principle-agent model in analyzing
the operations management problems. Corbett and deGroote (2000) derived the optimal
quantity discount policy for a single supplier single buyer supply chain under asymmetric
information. Corbett (2001) investigated stochastic inventory systems in a supply chain
where the supplier has private information about setup cost. Corbett et al. (1999) studied
how a supplier is impacted by the obtaining better information about the buyer’s cost struc-
ture. Xiao and Xu (2012) investigated R&D alliance strategy in the presence of asymmetric
effort information from both participants. Ha (2001) studied a contract to maximize the
supplier’s profit in a one-supplier-one-buyer relationship for a short-life-cycle product. In his
study, the reservation profit is fixed regardless of the agent’s type, whereas in our study the
agent’s reservation profit deviates based on his type, which brings in more computational
complexity.
2.3 Model Setup
We consider a two-tier decentralized supply chain with a national brand supplier and a
retailer. The national brand supplier produces a product at a cost of cn per unit with a
quality value qn. The national brand supplier distributes her product to consumers via the
retailer. In addition to selling the national brand product from the supplier, the retailer is
also able to produce and sell his store brand product at a cost of cs per unit with quality
value qs. As pointed out by Bergs-Sennou et al. (2004), consumers usually perceive the store
53
brand products having lower quality than the national brand products. Chung and Lee
(2017) also commented that in reality, NBs often times demonstrate superior brand equity
to the SBs, which leads to higher perceptional quality. Therefore, we make a reasonable
assumption that qs < qn to be consistent with Mills (1995), Chen et al. (2011), etc., and for
the analytical simplicity. We shall discuss a contrary case (i.e., qs > qn) in the conclusion
section. The unit production cost of store brand, cs, is private information for the retailer
only. The national brand supplier only has a subjective assessment about the retailer’s store
brand unit production cost. In details, the NB supplier believes that the retailer’s unit
production cost follows a discrete probability distribution and cs has two possible values,
denoted by cHs and c
L
s with respective probabilities v and 1 − v. For convenience, for the
remainder of this chapter, we call these two cost types “high cost” and “low cost.”
Figure 2.1: Sequence of events.
 
 
Nature reveals the 
true type of 𝑐𝑠 to 
the retailer only 
National brand 
supplier offers a 
menu of contracts 
Retailer determines 
the order quantity 
and/or production 
quantity 
The product(s) is 
produced and sold to 
the customers, and the 
profits are collected 
The sequence of events is illustrated in Figure 2.1. (1) Nature reveals the true type of cs
to the retailer only. (2) The national brand supplier offers a menu of two-part tariff contract
to the retailer. That is, the retailer pays the national brand supplier a wholesale price w and
a lump-sum payment T . (3) The retailer subsequently decides whether to accept the contract
and which contract to accept. The retailer also simultaneously decides whether to produce
his own store brand. If the retailer decides to carry the national brand (referred as NB
hereafter) product and/or the store brand (referred as SB hereafter) product, he shall decide
the NB and/or SB retail price pn and/or ps and their quantities Qn and/or Qs , respectively.
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Then the product(s) is (are) sold to consumers, and payments are collected. Following the
revelation principle, the supplier only needs to provide two contracts (wH , TH) and (wL, TL)
corresponding to the retailer’s two cost types in the menu to maximize her expected profit.
Next, we shall describe our demands for the national brand and/or SB products. Follow-
ing Mills (1995), Chen, et al. (2011) , and Fang, et al. (2013), we assume that consumers
who are interested in purchasing NB or SB are vertically heterogeneous with respect to their
evaluations (θ) on the product quality. From now on, we refer a consumer with a quality
evaluation parameter of θ as “consumer θ” for brevity. Consumers make purchasing decisions
based on their evaluations of the product quality and price. When a product with quality
level q is sold for $p per unit, consumer θ derives a utility function, U(θ) = θq − p. If there
is only one product available on the market, the consumer would purchase the product if
and only if his/her utility U(θ) for the product is positive. If there are multiple products
available on the market, he/she would purchase only the product which gives him/her the
highest positive utility. Without loss of generality, we assume the entire population of po-
tential consumers is normalized to 1. We further assume θ is uniformly distributed between
0 and 1.
In our model setup, the retailer has three options: (I) to accept a contract from the
supplier and carry the NB only (named as case I for the remainder of this chapter); (II) to
accept a contract from the supplier, carry the NB product and also introduce his own SB
(named as case II); (III) to reject the supplier’s contract and sell his SB only (named as
case III). In the two extreme cases, i.e., in case I or III, the retailer chooses to carry the
NB only or the SB only. Then only one product will be available on the market. Under
such circumstances, we define Ui(θ) = θqi − pi is the utility that the consumer θ derives for
product i, where i = s, n representing the SB(i = s) and NB(i = n) respectively. Following
Ui(θ) > 0 and the uniform distribution of θ from 0 to 1, we directly obtain the demand for
product i (i = s, n) is 1− pi/qi.
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Figure 2.2: Market segmentation for NB and SB when ps
qs
< pn−ps
qn−qs < 1.
Now we discuss the most interesting case, i.e., case II, in which the retailer decides to
carry both the national brand and store brand products. In this case, the consumer θ derives
the utility Ui(θ) = θqi− pi for product i = s, n simultaneously, and he/she will purchase the
one with a higher positive utility. We show that in order to ensure both products receive
positive demands, the retailer has to set the retail prices such that ps
qs
< pn−ps
qn−qs < 1, or
equivalently, ps
qs
< pn
qn
< 1 (due to qs < qn). For the consumers who purchase the national
brand product, it follows directly from Un(θ) > Us(θ) that θ >
pn−ps
qn−qs . Figure 2.2 further
shows the market segmentation for NB and SB under such conditions.
When the condition of ps
qs
< pn−ps
qn−qs < 1 is not satisfied, only one brand (either NB or SB)
has positive demand. Table 2.1 summarizes the demands for NB and SB as a function of
the SB retail price.
In sum, we provide the list of all mathematical notations used in this chapter in Table
2.2. As a benchmark for the asymmetric information case, we also investigate the symmetric
Table 2.1: Demands for NB and SB as a function of ps
Ranges for ps Demand for NB Demand for SB
ps >
pnqs
qn
1− pn
qn
0
pn − qn + qs ≤ ps ≤ pnqsqn 1−
pn−ps
qn−qs
pn−ps
qn−qs −
ps
qs
ps < pn − qn + qs 0 1− psqs
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Table 2.2: List of mathematical notations used.
Notation Definition
Πn NB supplier’s profit function
Πr Retailer’s profit function
Qn(Qs) NB (SB) production quantity
pn(ps) NB (SB) product retail price
qn(qs) NB (SB) product quality
θ Consumer’s quality evaluation parameter
cn(cs) NB (SB) unit production cost
cHs (c
L
s ) Estimated high-type (low-type) SB unit production cost
w Unit wholesale price paid to the NB supplier
T Fixed lump-sum payment paid to the NB supplier
wH(wL) Unit wholesale price for high-type (low-type) retailer
TH(TL) Fixed lump-sum payment for high-type (low-type) retailer
information case, i.e., the supplier knows about the retailer’s store brand cost, cs.
2.4 Retailer’s problem
Following the backward induction, we analyze the retailer’s problem first. In this section,
without loss of generality, we can suppress the superscript i (i = L,H) which denotes the
retailer’s type from the parameter cis and variables w
i and T i for notational convenience.
Furthermore, since the retailer knows his own type, the retailer’s problem under asymmetric
information is the same as that under symmetric information. Hence, the retailer’s problem
is to figure out his best response for any given contract (w, T ) offered by the supplier.
As specified in the previous section, the retailer’s reaction falls into one of the following
three cases: (I) the retailer accepts the supplier’s contract and only sells the NB; (II) the
retailer accepts the supplier’s contract and sells both NB and SB; (III) the retailer rejects
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the supplier’s contract and only sells his own SB. In summary, the retailer’s profit function
can be written as follows:
Πr =

ΠIr(pn, Qn) = (pn − w)Qn − T
ΠIIr (pn, Qn, ps, Qs) = (pn − w)Qn − T + (ps − cs)Qs
ΠIIIr (ps, Qs) = (ps − cs)Qs
(2.4.1)
For the two extreme cases, case (I) and (III), it is straightforward to derive the following
result:
Lemma 2.1. For any given (w, T ) contract offered by the supplier, if the retailer accepts
the contract and only carries NB, then his optimal decision and profit are pI∗n =
w+qn
2
, QI∗n =
1
2
− w
2qn
, and ΠI∗r =
(qn−w)2
4qn
−T ; if the retailer rejects the contract and chooses to carry SB only,
then his optimal decision and profit are pIII∗s =
cs+qs
2
, QIII∗n =
1
2
− cs
2qs
, and ΠIII∗r =
(qs−cs)2
4qs
.
Note that ΠIII∗r is the retailer’s optimal profit when he carries his SB only. Therefore, we
can consider ΠIII∗r as the retailer’s reservation profit. The retailer would only do business
with the NB supplier when he can obtain a higher profit than his reservation profit.
In the case II, the retailer decides to carry both NB and SB. Following the demand
functions specified in Table 2.1, the retailer has to set the retail prices such that pn−qn+qs ≤
ps ≤ pnqsqn , under which both products have positive demands and we have
Qn = Dn = 1−
pn − ps
qn − qs
, Qs = Ds =
pn − ps
qn − qs
− ps
qs
.
Subsequently, the retailer’s profit function reduces to
ΠIIr (pn, ps) = (pn − w)(1−
pn − ps
qn − qs
) + (ps − cs)(
pn − ps
qn − qs
− ps
qs
)− T.
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Taking derivatives of ΠIIr with respect to pn and ps, we obtain
∂ΠIIr
∂pn
= 1− 2(pn − ps)− w + cs
qn − qs
,
∂ΠIIr
∂ps
=
2(pn − ps)− w + cs
qn − qs
− 2ps − cs
qs
,
∂2ΠIIr
∂p2n
=
−2
qn − qs
< 0,
∂2ΠIIr
∂p2n
∂2ΠIIr
∂p2s
− ( ∂
2ΠIIr
∂pn∂ps
)2 =
4
qs(qn − qs)
> 0.
Hence, we show the Hessian matrix of the retailer’s profit function ΠIIr is negative definite.
Then, by setting ∂Π
II
r
∂pn
= 0 and ∂Π
II
r
∂ps
= 0, we get the interior optimal solution
pII∗n =
w + qn
2
, pII∗s =
cs + qs
2
(2.4.2)
Furthermore, we need to derive the conditions under which these retail prices satisfy the
aforementioned condition, pn − qn + qs ≤ ps ≤ pnqsqn . When p
II∗
n and p
II∗
s do not satisfy
this condition, the retailer’s maximum profit under case II would be achieved at a corner
solution. By carefully comparing the retailer’s maximum profits under cases I, II, and III,
we can characterize the retailer’s best response for any given contract (w, T ) offered by the
supplier as follows:
Proposition 2.1.
(I) If 0 ≤ w ≤ csqn
qs
and T ≤ T̄ I(w) where
T̄ I(w)
def
=
(qn − w)2
4qn
− (qs − cs)
2
4qs
, (2.4.3)
then the retailer shall carry NB only, and p∗n = p
I∗
n , Q
∗
n = Q
I∗
n given in Lemma 2.1,
(II) If csqn
qs
< w ≤ cs + qn − qs and T ≤ T̄ II(w) where
T̄ II(w)
def
=
(cs − w + qn − qs)2
4(qn − qs)
, (2.4.4)
then the retailer will carry both NB and SB, and p∗n = p
II∗
n , p
∗
s = p
II∗
s given by (2.4.2),
Q∗n = 1− w−cs2(qn−qs) , Q
∗
s =
w−cs
2(qn−qs) −
cs+qn
2qs
.
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(III) If w ≤ csqn
qs
and T > T̄ I(w) or csqn
qs
< w ≤ cs+qn−qs and T > T̄ II(w), or w > cs+qn−qs
and T ≥ 0, the retailer will carry SB only, and p∗s = pIII∗s , Q∗s = Q
III∗
s given in Lemma 2.1.
It is straightforward to show that T̄ I(w) = T̄ II(w) = (qs−cs)
2(qn−qs)
4q2s
at w = csqn
qs
and
T̄ II(w) = 0 at w = cs + qn − qs. Since csqnqs < cs + qn − qs due to qn > qs, Proposition 2.1
completely characterize the retailer’s optimal response for any given (w, T ) with w ≥ 0, T ≥ 0
chosen by the NB supplier. Proposition 2.1 can be further illustrated by the following Figure
2.3.
Figure 2.3: Retailer’s Best Response given any (w, T ).
 
Figure 2.3 shows that for any wholesale price, w ∈ [0, cs + qn− qs], if the supplier charges
a fixed payment T below the threshold T̄ I(w) or T̄ II(w), the retailer would carry the NB,
otherwise, the retailer would not carry the NB. Furthermore, Figure 3 shows that when the
supplier charges a wholesale price low enough, i.e., w ≤ csqn
qs
and a fixed payment below the
threshold T̄ I(w), then it is best for the retailer to carry NB only; when the wholesale price
is in the medium range, (i.e., csqn
qs
< w ≤ cs + qn − qs) and the fixed payment is below the
threshold T̄ II(w), the retailer would carry both NB and SB; when the wholesale price is too
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high (i.e., w > cs + qn − qs) or the fixed payment is above the threshold, the retailer would
carry SB only.
2.5 Supplier’s problem
Unlike the retailer’s problem, the supplier’s problem under asymmetric information differs
from that under symmetric information. In this section, we first solve the supplier’s problem
under symmetric information as the benchmark for the asymmetric information case, then
we solve the supplier’s problem under asymmetric information.
2.5.1 Symmetric Information
Under symmetric information, the retailer’s type is known to the national brand supplier.
Hence, based on the retailer’s best response summarized in Proposition 2.1, we need to figure
out the supplier’s optimal contract, (w∗, T ∗), which maximizes her profit function:
Πn(w, T ) =

ΠIn = (w − cn)(12 −
w
2qn
) + T, if w ≤ csqn
qs
& T ≤ T̄ I(w)
ΠIIn = (w − cn)[1− w−cs2(qn−qs) ] + T, if
csqn
qs
< w ≤ cs + qn − qs & T ≤ T̄ II(w),
0, otherwise.
(2.5.1)
After some algebra, we derive the following result:
Lemma 2.2. Under symmetric information,
(I) If cn ≤ csqnqs , then the supplier’s optimal contract is w
∗ = cn, T
∗ = T̄ I(cn) =
(qn−cn)2
4qn
−
(qs−cs)2
4qs
, under which the retailer only carries NB, Π∗n =
(qn−cn)2
4qn
− (qs−cs)
2
4qs
, and Π∗r = Π
III∗
r
given in Lemma 2.1.
(II) If csqn
qs
< cn ≤ cs + qn − qs, the supplier’s optimal contract is w∗ = cn, T ∗ = T̄ II(cn) =
(qn−cn−qs+cs)2
4(qn−qs) , under which the retailer carries both NB and SB, Π
∗
n =
(qn−cn−qs+cs)2
4(qn−qs) , and
Π∗r = Π
III∗
r .
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(III) If cn > cs + qn − qs, it is not profitable for the national brand supplier to sell the NB
product to the retailer and the retailer only carries SB, i.e., Π∗n = 0 and Π
∗
r = Π
III∗
r .
Lemma 2.2 suggests that under symmetric information, the national brand supplier will
charge a wholesale price equal to her production cost and a fixed payment as high as the
threshold to earn her first-best profit, and the retailer always earns her reservation profit,
i.e., ΠIII∗r , which is his optimal profit when he sells his SB only. In addition, NB production
cost plays a critical role in the supplier’s problem. When the NB cost is low, the supplier is
able to offer a low wholesale price and fixed payment to prevent the retailer from introducing
his own SB; when the NB cost is medium, the supplier is not able to lower his wholesale
price and fixed payment to prevent the retailer from introducing his SB, and the retailer
would carry both NB and SB; when the NB cost is too high, it is best for the supplier not
to do business with the retailer and the retailer would carry his SB only.
2.5.2 Asymmetric Information
When the retailer holds private information on his store brand cost, the national brand
supplier can no longer achieve her first-best profit. Instead, she confronts the challenge of
designing a menu of incentive compatible contracts to extract the retailer’s private informa-
tion by giving up the information rent to the retailer. Based on the revelation principle, the
supplier needs to offer a menu of two contracts, i.e., (wL, TL), (wH , TH), corresponding to
the two cost types of the SB, to maximize her expected profit subject to the incentive com-
patibility (IC) and the individual rationality (IR) constraints. Hence, the supplier’s problem
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can be described as as follows:
max
(wH ,TH),(wL,TL)
Πn = vΠn(w
H , TH , cHs ) + (1− v)Πn(wL, TL, cLs ). (2.5.2a)
subject to
(I.C.H) Πr(w
H , TH , cHs ) ≥ Πr(wL, TL, cHs ) (2.5.2b)
(I.C.L) Πr(w
L, TL, cLs ) ≥ Πr(wH , TH , cLs ) (2.5.2c)
(I.R.H) Πr(w
H , TH , cHs ) ≥ ΠIII∗r (cHs ) (2.5.2d)
(I.R.L) Πr(w
L, TL, cLs ) ≥ ΠIII∗r (cLs ), (2.5.2e)
in which Πr(w
i, T i, cjs) (i, j = L,H) denotes the type-j retailer’s resulting profit when he
chooses contract (wi, T i), and Πn(w
i, T i, cis) (i = L,H) represents the supplier’s profit when
the type-i retailer chooses contract (wi, T i). Constraints (I.R.H.) and (I.R.L.) ensure that
both types of the retailer earn at least their respective reservation profits (i.e., ΠIII∗r ) therefore
do business with the supplier. It is worth mentioning that the IR constraints here are type-
dependent because the retailer’s reservation profits vary between the two types, which brings
additional complexity to this problem. Moreover, it follows from the equation of ΠIII∗r in
Lemma 2.1 that ΠIIIr (c
L
s ) > Π
III
r (c
H
s ) due to c
L
s < c
H
s , which indicates that the low-cost
retailer has a higher reservation profit. Constraints (I.C.H.) and (I.C.L.) guarantee that
each type of the retailer would be more profitable by choosing the right contract consistent
with his true type than by choosing the wrong contract.
To reduce the complexity of the optimality search, we further examine the four constraints
and recognize a redundant constraint.
Lemma 2.3. Following (I.C.H.), (I.R.L.), and cLs < c
H
s , (I.R.H.) is a redundant constraint.
Lemma 2.3 implies that (I.R.H) will not be binding for any feasible solution to the
supplier’s problem, which means that the high-type retailer is guaranteed to earn a profit
strictly higher than his reservation profit. This result can be explained intuitively as follows:
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Recall that the low-type retailer is more cost effective in producing the SB than the high-
type retailer (due to cLs < c
H
s ), and the low-type retailer has a higher reservation profit than
the high-type retailer. Hence, the high-type retailer has an incentive to mimic the low-type
retailer, but the low-type retailer has no incentive to mimic the high-type retailer. As a
result, the supplier has to offer the high-type retailer an information rent, i.e., the additional
profit above his reservation profit, to prevent the high-type retailer from mimicking the
low-type retailer.
As specified in Proposition 2.1, for any given contract (w, T ) offered by the NB supplier,
the retailer’s best response falls into one of the three cases: (I) the retailer carries NB
only; (II) the retailer carries NB and SB, and (III) the retailer carries SB only. Although
constraints (I.R.H) and (I.R.L) ensure that both types of the retailer would do business with
the NB supplier, i.e., the retailer would react according to case (I) or (II), the retailer’s
profit function Πr given in (2.4.1) and the supplier’s profit function Πn given in (2.5.1)
have different function forms under case (I) and case (II). Therefore, in order to derive the
optimal menu of contracts for the supplier, we have to break down the supplier’s optimization
problem (2.5.2) into four subproblems corresponding to four possible options of the supplier’s
decision variables, denoted by (HI , LI), (HII , LI), (HI , LII), and (HII , LII), where we define
(H i, Lj) (i, j = I, II) as the subset of the supplier’s menu of contracts which would induce
the high-type retailer to select case i and the low-type retailer to choose case j. Further
study on these four contract options reveals the following result:
Lemma 2.4. (HII , LI) contract is not a feasible option for the supplier.
The definition of (HII , LI) contract implies that this subset of (wL, TL) and (wH , TH)
would induce the the low-type retailer to carry SB only and the high-type retailer to carry
both NB and SB. If (wL, TL) is good enough for the low-type retailer to carry SB only,
then it must be good enough for the high-type retailer to carry SB only because Proposition
64
2.1 and cLs < c
H
s imply that if w
L ≤ cLs & TL ≤ T̄ I(wL|cs = cLs ), then wL ≤ cHs & TL ≤
T̄ I(wL|cs = cHs ). Moreover, constraint (I.C.H) ensures that (wH , TH) is more attractive than
(wL, TL) to the high-type retailer. Hence, (wH , TH) must also be good enough to induce the
high-type retailer to carry NB only. Consequently, (HII , LI) is never a feasible option for
the supplier.
Lemma 2.4 slims down the range of our optimality search. Thereafter, we only need to
analyze three contract options, (HI , LI), (HI , LII), and (HII , LII).
Recall from Lemma 2.3 that (I.R.H) is a redundant constraint. In fact, constraint (I.C.L)
is redundant as well. First, we shall obtain the optimal solution to the supplier’s problem
in (2.5.2) by considering (I.C.H) and (I.R.L) constraints only, and later we would show
that this optimal solution indeed satisfies constraint (I.C.L). Second, we would demonstrate
constraints (I.C.H.) and (I.R.L.) must be binding at optimality. Lemma 2.1 and Proposition
2.1 imply that for any (w, T ) offered by the supplier, the retailer’s optimal decisions in
pn, ps, Qn, Qs are not directly affected by T . Moreover, (2.4.1) and (2.5.1) show that the
retailer’s profit is decreasing in the fixed payment T , and the supplier’s profit is increasing
in T . Therefore, if (I.C.H) or (I.R.L) is not binding at optimality, then the national brand
supplier could further improve her profit by simply increasing TL or TH until both (I.C.H)
and (I.R.L) are binding.
Using the binding constrains (I.R.L) and (I.C.H), we can derive TL and TH as func-
tions of wL and wH . In this way, we can convert the supplier’s problem in (2.5.2) into an
unconstrained optimization problem, i.e., max Πn(w
L, wH).
Before proceeding the analysis, for notational convenience, we summarize the T̄ functions
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given in (2.4.3)-(2.4.4) as follows: for all i = L,H,
T̄ i(w)
def
=

T̄ Ii(w) =
(qn − w)2
4qn
− (qs − c
i
s)
2
4qs
, if 0 ≤ w ≤ c
i
sqn
qs
T̄ IIi(w) =
(qn − w + cis − qs)2
4qs
, if
cisqn
qs
< w ≤ cis + qn − qs
0, if w > cis + qn − qs.
(2.5.3)
The definition of T̄ i here unifies T̄ I and T̄ II given in Proposition 2.1 for both types of the
retailer. Additionally, we establish the following relationship between T̄H(w) and T̄L(w).
Lemma 2.5. For all w ≥ 0, T̄H(w) > T̄L(w).
Consistent with our intuition, Lemma 2.5 simply indicates that when the store brand
cost increases, the retailer becomes less competitive, then the supplier is able to charge a
higher fixed payment, i.e., the threshold of the fixed payment T̄ increases as well.
2.5.2.1 (HI , LI) Contract
According to Proposition 2.1, (HI , LI) contract refers to a subset of the supplier’s menu
of contracts such that (wH , TH), (wL, TL) satisfying the conditions of wH ≤ c
H
s qn
qs
, TH ≤
T̄H(wH) = T̄ IH(wH), wL ≤ c
L
s qn
qs
, TL ≤ T̄L(wL) = T̄ IL(wL). Under (HI , LI) contract, the
retailer would carry the NB only regardless of his type, i.e.,
Πr(w
i, T i, cis) = Π
I∗
r (w
i, T i, cis)
lemma 2.1
=
(qn − wi)2
4qn
− T i,∀i = L,H.
In this case, following (2.5.1), the supplier’s profit function is expressed as
Πn = v
[
(wH − cn)(
1
2
− w
H
2qn
) + TH
]
+ (1− v)
[
(wL − cn)(
1
2
− w
L
2qn
) + TL
]
In conjunction with cLs < c
H
s , we have w
L ≤ c
L
s
qn
< c
H
s
qn
and TL ≤ T̄ IL(wL)
(2.5.3)
≤ T̄ IH(wL).
Therefore, if the high-type retailer chooses (wL, TL), he will still carry NB only (case I), i.e.,
Πr(w
L, TL, cHs ) = Π
I∗
r (w
L, TL, cHs ). From the binding constraints (I.C.H.) and (I.R.L.), we
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can directly derive that TL and TH as functions of wL and wH below.
TL = T̄ IL(wL) =
(qn − wL)2
4qn
− (qs − c
L
s )
2
4qs
,
and
TH =
(qn − wH)2
4qn
− (qn − w
L)2
4qn
+ TL =
(qn − wH)2
4qn
− (qs − c
L
s )
2
4qs
. (2.5.4)
2.5.2.2 (HI , LII) Contract
According to Proposition 2.1, (HI , LII) contract refers to a subset of (wH , TH), (wL, TL)
which satisfies the conditions of wH ≤ c
H
s qn
qs
, TH ≤ T̄ IH(wH), c
L
s qn
qs
< wL ≤ cLs + qn− qs, TL ≤
T̄ IIL(wL). Under (HI , LII) contract, the high-type retailer would carry the NB only and the
low-type retailer would carry both NB and SB. Consequently, the supplier’s expected profit
function becomes
Πn = v[(w
H − cn)(
1
2
− w
H
2qn
) + TH ] + (1− v)[(wL − cn)(
1
2
− w
L − cLs
2(qn − qs)
) + TL]
Setting (I.R.L.) to be binding, we have Πr(w
L, TL, cLs ) = Π
II
r (w
L, TL, cLs ) = Π
III∗
r (c
L
s ), which
implies
TL = T̄ IIL(wL)
(2.5.3)
=
(cLs − wL + qn − qs)2
4(qn − qs)
.
Unlike the previous (HI , LI) case, under (HI , LII) contract, the high-type retailer’s re-
sponse to the low-type contract is not definite, i.e., the function form of Πr(w
L, TL, cHs ) varies
depending on the model parameters. Due to qn > qs, we have
cisqn
qs
< cis + qn − qs for all
i = L,H. In conjunction with cLs < c
H
s , we have
cLs qn
qs
< c
H
s qn
qs
< cHs + qn − qs. However, the
relationship between c
H
s qn
qs
and cLs + qn − qs is indefinite. Therefore, we need to consider the
following two parameter settings for the cost-quality relationship, i.e., cLs + qn − qs ≤
cHs qn
qs
and c
H
s qn
qs
< cLs + qn − qs.
(i) cLs + qn − qs ≤
cHs qn
qs
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In this parameter setting, we have wL ≤ cLs + qn − qs ≤
cHs qn
qs
, TL = T̄ IIL(wL) = T̄L(wL) <
T̄H(wL) = T̄ IH(wL) (by Lemma 2.5). Proposition 2.1 implies that Πr(w
L, TL, cHs ) =
ΠIr(w
L, TL, cHs ). As a result, setting (I.C.H.) to be binding, we obtain T
H as a function
of wL and wH , i.e.,
TH =
(cLs − wL + qn − qs)2
4(qn − qs)
+
(qn − wH)2
4qn
− (qn − w
L)2
4qn
(2.5.5)
(ii) c
H
s qn
qs
< cLs + qn − qs
Under this parameter setting, we need to distinguish two possible subcases that differentiate
on wL: wL ≤ c
H
s qn
qs
, and wL > c
H
s qn
qs
. These two subcontracts are notated as (HI , LII : c
L
s qn
qs
<
wL ≤ c
H
s qn
qs
) and (HI , LII : c
H
s qn
qs
< wL ≤ cLs + qn − qs).
(ii.1) (HI , LII : c
L
s qn
qs
< wL ≤ c
H
s qn
qs
)
Since wL ≤ c
H
s qn
qs
, TL = T̄L(wL) < T̄H(wL) as in case (i), we still have Πr(w
L, TL, cHs ) =
ΠIr(w
L, TL, cHs ). Setting (I.C.H.) to be binding yields that T
H follows the same equation
given in (2.5.7).
(ii.2) (HI , LII : c
H
s qn
qs
< wL ≤ cLs + qn − qs)
For any wL ∈ ( c
H
s qn
qs
, cLs + qn − qs] and TL = T̄ IIL(wL), we have
cHs qn
qs
< wL < cHs + qn − qs
and TL = T̄L(wL) < T̄H(wL) = T̄ IIH(wL). Therefore, Proposition 2.1 implies that if a
high-type retailer chooses (wL, TL), he shall carry both NB and SB, i.e., Πr(w
L, TL, cHs ) =
ΠIIr (w
L, TL, cHs ). Setting (I.C.H.) to be binding yields that
TH =
(qn − wH)2
4qn
−qn − w
L
2
(
1
2
− w
L − cHs
2(qn − qs)
)+
qs − cHs
2
(
wL − cHs
2(qn − qs)
− c
H
s
2qs
)+
(cLs − wL + qn − qs)2
4(qn − qs)
.
(2.5.6)
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2.5.2.3 (HII , LII) Contract
Proposition 2.1 implies that (HII , LII) contract refers to a subset of (wH , TH), (wL, TL)
satisfying the conditions of c
H
s qn
qs
< wH ≤ cHs + qn − qs, TH ≤ T̄ IIH(wH) and
cLs qn
qs
< wL ≤
cLs + qn− qs, TL ≤ T̄ IIL(wL). Under (HII , LII) contract, the retailer shall carry both brands
regardless of his type. Consequently, the supplier’s expected profit function becomes
Πn = v[(w
H − cn)(
1
2
− w
H − cHs
2(qn − qs)
) + TH ] + (1− v)[(wL − cn)(
1
2
− w
L − cLs
2(qn − qs)
) + TL].
The binding (I.R.L) constraint implies that TL = T̄ IIL(wL). Similar to (HI , LII) contract,
it is complex to predict the high-type retailer’s response if he chooses the low-type contract.
Following the similar steps, we can derive the TH as a function of wL, wH as below:
(i) If cLs + qn − qs ≤
cHs qn
qs
or { c
H
s qn
qs
> cLs + qn − qs &
cLs qn
qs
< wL ≤ c
H
s qn
qs
}, then
TH =
qn − wH
2
(
1
2
− w
H − cHs
2(qn − qs)
) +
qs − cHs
2
(
wH − cHs
2(qn − qs)
− c
H
s
2qs
) +
(cLs − wL + qn − qs)
2
4(qn − qs)
− (qn − w
L)
2
4qn
. (2.5.7)
(ii) If c
H
s qn
qs
< wL ≤ cLs + qn − qs, then
TH =
cLs
2
+ (wH − qn + qs)
2
+ 2cLs (qn − qs − wL)− 2cHs (wH − wL)
4(qn − qs)
. (2.5.8)
2.5.2.4 Optimal Contract
Substituting the TL and TH functions into each corresponding objective function respec-
tively, the resulting Πn becomes a two-dimensional function of w
L and wH . To solve for the
optimal wL∗ and wH∗ for the supplier’s problem, we make two technical assumptions for the
remainder of the chapter as follows:
1. We assume (1 − v)qn − vqs > 0 to ensure the concavity of the objective function on
wL for any wL ∈ ( c
L
s qn
qs
, cLs + qn − qs]. Otherwise, if Πn is convex on wL, the case II contract
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Table 2.3: Optimal (wH∗, wL∗) under Parameter Setting cLs + qn − qs <
cHs qn
qs
cn interval: cn ≤ c
L
s qn
qs
cLs qn
qs
< cn ≤ c(1)n c(1)n < cn ≤ cLs + qn − qs
(HI , LI)
wH∗ cn cn
cHs qn
qs
wL∗ cn
cLs qn
qs
cLs qn
qs
(HI , LII)
wH∗ cn cn cn
wL∗ c
L
s qn
qs
(cn−vcn−vcLs )qn
qn−vqn−vqs c
L
s + qn − qs
(HII , LII)
wH∗
cHs qn
qs
cHs qn
qs
cHs qn
qs
wL∗ c
L
s qn
qs
(cn−vcn−vcLs )qn
qn−vqn−vqs c
L
s + qn − qs
for low type, LII , will always be dominated by LI or be better off to not offer any contract
(case III).
2. We only discuss under cn ≤ cLs + qn− qs such that both types are willing to carry NB.
With some algebra, we obtain the local optimal whole prices under each contract type,
highlight in blue in Table 2.3 and Table 2.4. Note that c
(1)
n
def
= c
L
s (qn−vqs)+(qn−qs)((1−v)qn−vqs)
(1−v)qn ,
c
(2)
n
def
= c
H
s qn
qs
− v(c
H
s −cLs )
1−v , and c
(3)
n
def
= cLs + qn − qs −
v(cHs −cLs )
1−v .
In order to search for the global optimality, we compare the derived optimal solutions
among all the contract types and parameter settings. As presented in Table 2.3 and 2.4, we
need to analyze the national brand supplier’s expected profit function under the two parallel
parameter settings, i.e., cLs +qn−qs ≤
cHs qn
qs
and c
H
s qn
qs
< cLs +qn−qs. If cLs +qn−qs ≤
cHs qn
qs
, there
are three possible contract options (HI , LI), (HI , LII), (HII , LII); if c
H
s qn
qs
< cLs +qn−qs, there
are five possible contract options (HI , LI), (HI , LII : c
L
s qn
qs
< wL ≤ c
H
s qn
qs
), (HI , LII : c
H
s qn
qs
<
wL ≤ cLs + qn− qs), (HII , LII :
cLs qn
qs
< wL ≤ c
H
s qn
qs
) and (HII , LII : c
H
s qn
qs
< wL ≤ cLs + qn− qs).
We compare the supplier’s optimal profit across these contracts for each parameter setting.
The results are summarized in the Proposition below.
Proposition 2.2. Under asymmetric information, the national brand supplier’s optimal
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menu of contracts is as follows:
(i) If cLs +qn−qs ≤
cHs qn
qs
, then the national brand supplier’s optimal contract (H∗, L∗) is given
by
(H∗, L∗) =
 (HI , LI), if cn ≤
cLs qn
qs
(HI , LII), if c
L
s qn
qs
< cn ≤ cLs + qn − qs.
(ii) If c
H
s qn
qs
< cLs + qn − qs, then the national brand supplier’s optimal contract (H∗, L∗) is
given by
(H∗, L∗) =

(HI , LI), if cn ≤ c
L
s qn
qs
(HI , LII), if c
L
s qn
qs
< cn ≤ c
H
s qn
qs
(HII , LII), if c
H
s qn
qs
< cn ≤ cLs + qn − qs.
Proposition 2.2 verifies that under asymmetric information the national brand’s produc-
tion cost still has a significant impact on the supplier’s optimal contract design. Low-type
retailer is more competitive than the high-type retailer. As the NB production cost increases,
the supplier firstly loses the capability to prevent the introduction of SB for the low-type
retailer, and then that of the high-type retailer.
The detailed optimal decisions for the supplier are summarized below.
Corollary 2.1. The optimal menu of contracts (wH∗, TH∗), (wL∗, TL∗), i.e., the solution to
(2.5.2), is
(i) If cLs + qn−qs ≤
cHs qn
qs
, then
wL∗ =

cn, if cn ≤ c
L
s qn
qs
(cn−vcn−vcLs )qn
qn−vqn−vqs , if
cLs qn
qs
< cn ≤ c(1)n
cLs + qn − qs, if c
(1)
n < cn ≤ cLs + qn − qs.
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(ii) If c
H
s qn
qs
< cLs + qn−qs, then
wL∗ =

cn, if cn ≤ c
L
s qn
qs
(cn−vcn−vcLs )qn
qn−vqn−vqs , if
cLs qn
qs
< cn ≤ c(2)n
cn +
v(cHs −cLs )
1−v , if c
(2)
n < cn ≤ c(3)n
cLs + qn − qs, if c
(3)
n < cn ≤ cLs + qn − qs.
TL∗ = T̄L(wL∗) given in (2.5.3), wH∗ = cn, and T
H∗ can be found by substituting wH∗
and wL∗ into the respective TH function given in (2.5.4)-(2.5.8) under the optimal contract
(H∗, L∗).
After substituting wH∗ and wL∗ into TH∗, we do have TH∗ ≥ T̄L(wH∗). In conjunction
with Proposition 2.1 and the binding (I.R.L) constraint, it is straightforward to obtain
Πr(w
L∗, TL∗, cLs ) = Π
III∗
r (c
L
s ) ≥ Πr(wH∗, TH∗, cLs ), which implies that constraint (I.C.L) is
indeed satisfied by the optimal solution.
2.6 Managerial Implication
In this section, we investigate how the model parameters influence the value of information
for the national brand supplier and the retailer. Proposition 2.2 has shown that the optimal
contract varies based on the parameters such as NB and SB production cost and product
quality. In-depth analysis on these parameters shall provide useful managerial insights for
both the supplier and the retailer.
The value of information for each entity in the supply chain is quantified as the differ-
ence between his (her) optimal expected profits under symmetric information (denoted as
ΠSym∗i , i = n, r) and asymmetric information (denoted as Π
Aym∗
i , i = n, r). Under symmet-
ric information, the supplier, as the leader of the Stackelberg game, will extract the entire
supply chain profit and leave the retailer only his reservation profit regardless of his type.
However, in the presence of information asymmetry, the supplier would give up some in-
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formation rent to the retailer so the retailer is induced to truthfully reveal his type. Our
results show that the high-type retailer earns a positive information rent in addition to his
reservation profit and the low-type retailer still obtains the reservation profit only. That is,
the retailer’s overall expected profit under asymmetric information is higher than that under
symmetric information. Consequently, the retailer’s valuation of his own SB cost information
is Vr = Π
Sym∗
r −ΠAsy∗r = −vU , where U denotes the information rent given up by the supplier
to the high-type retailer. To simplify the interpretations, we use the absolute value of Vr,
i.e., |Vr|, to reference the value of information to the retailer in the following discussions. On
the contrary, the NB supplier’s profit under symmetric information is higher than that under
asymmetric information, the value of information to the supplier, i.e., Vn = Π
Sym∗
n −ΠAsy∗n , is
positive. We first compare the values of information to each entity and obtain the following
Proposition.
Proposition 2.3. Vn ≥ |Vr|.
Proposition 2.3 implies that the value of information to the NB supplier is higher than
that to the retailer. Under symmetric information, as indicated in Lemma 2.2, the NB
supplier’s optimal wholesale price is always equal to her production cost regardless of the
retailer’s type. Hence, there exists no efficiency loss for both types of the retailer. However,
under asymmetric information, there is efficiency loss for the low-type retailer due to the
double marginalization, as indicated in Corollary 2.1 that wL∗ ≥ cn = wH
∗
. As a result,
under asymmetric information, the NB supplier has to not only surrender the information
rent to the high-type retailer, but also suffer from the efficiency loss for the low-type retailer.
Recall that |Vr| represents the retailer’s expected information rent only. Hence, the value of
information to the NB supplier is greater than that to the retailer.
In the following subsections, we explore the impact of a change in the NB/SB cost or
quality on the value of information to the supplier or the retailer. To facilitate the discussions,
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we refer to ”decrease” or ”increase” in a weak sense, i.e., ”decrease” means ”non-increase”,
and ”increase” means ”non-decrease”.
2.6.1 Production Cost
We first explore how a change in the unit production cost of the NB affects the value of
information to each entity while keeping other parameters constant.
Proposition 2.4. Vn and |Vr| are decreasing in cn.
In the presence of asymmetric information, the national brand supplier’s expected profit
is compromised due to the information rent offered to the retailer. When the NB produc-
tion cost increases and other model parameters remain unchanged, the supplier tends to
charge higher wholesale prices to sustain her profitability. In other words, the supplier has
the tendency to offer lower information rent to the retailer, i.e., |Vr| decreases. When the
NB production cost increases, the NB supplier’s profits under symmetric and asymmetric
information decrease simultaneously. However, the decrease under asymmetric information
is less than that under symmetric information because the supplier offers lower information
rent to the retailer under asymmetric information. Therefore, the value of information to
the supplier decreases as well.
We next analyze the impact of SB costs, cHs and c
L
s , on the value of information to the
supplier and the retailer, respectively.
Proposition 2.5. Vn is increasing in c
H
s and decreasing in c
L
s .
While SB cost is held as private information by the retailer, the high-type retailer has the
tendency to mimic the low-type retailer. When the high-type SB cost (cHs ) increases or the
low-type SB cost (cLs ) decreases unilaterally, the gap between the two possible values of the
SB cost is enlarged. In other words, the NB supplier is more uncertain about the retailer’s
SB cost. Hence, the value of information to the supplier becomes higher.
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We next examine the impact of cHs and c
L
s on the value of information to the retailer.
Our analytical results indicate that Vr could either increase or decrease on c
i
s,∀i = L,H. We
show an examples for cHs and c
L
s , respectively.
Example 1: cn = 509, qn = 665, qs = 208, c
L
s = 140, v = 0.659. As c
H
s increases from 161
to 171 then to 181, |Vr| increases from 0.8773 to 0.9756 then decreases to 0.8678.
Example 2: cn = 228, qn = 334, qs = 251, c
H
s = 173, v = 0.259. As c
L
s increases from 149
to 159 then to 169, |Vr| increases from 0.1623 to 0.3231 then decreases to 0.1546.
Note that the information rent,|Vr|, is paid to the high-type retailer and weighted by
the probability of high type v. The capability of paying the information rent depends on
the supplier’s overall expected profit and, furthermore, the competition situation between
NB and SB, which is essentially influenced by the relationship among cHs , c
L
s and cn. In-
tuitively, the supplier’s relative competitive advantage could vary depending on the gap
between the two possible types and the probability of the each type. Although holding other
parameter constant, different combinations of cHs , c
L
s , v and cn could present various part-
nership/competition situations between the supplier and retailer. In addition, Proposition 4
illustrates that the information rent tents to decreases on cn whereas Proposition 5 shows a
positive relationship between the value of information to the supplier and the gap between cHs
and cLs . With such complication, the information rent |Vr| could either increases or decrease
on cHs and c
L
s .
2.6.2 Product Quality
We proceed to investigate how the product quality affects the value of private information
for the supplier and the retailer. Recall that the product quality is a perceptional value
evaluated by the customer. That is, the parameters qn and qs are exogenous factors in the
model.
Proposition 2.6. For the retailer, under cLs + qn− qs <
cHs qn
qs
, |Vr| is decreasing on qn ∀qn ∈
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(cn− cLs + qs,
(1−v)cn−cLs +qs+
√
((1−v)cn−cLs +qs)2−4(1−v)vqs(qs−cLs )
2(1−v) ) and then increasing on qn ∀qn ≥
(1−v)cn−cLs +qs+
√
((1−v)cn−cLs +qs)2−4(1−v)vqs(qs−cLs )
2(1−v) ; under
cHs qn
qs
< cLs + qn − qs, |Vr| is decreasing
on qn ∀qn ∈ (cn− cLs + qs, cn− cLs + qs +
v(cHs −cLs )
1−v ), and then increasing on qn ∀qn ≥ cn− c
L
s +
qs +
v(cHs −cLs )
1−v .
When NB quality is very high such that qn >
cnqs
cLs
, the supplier is fully capable of offer a
menu of contract following which the retailer will carry NB only regardless of his type. Thus
in this case the information rent is insensitive to qn. If the NB quality is in a medium range, he
starts to lose the ability of preventing the introduction of SB. Recall that the fundamental
paradox in this supply chain is that if the retailer carries both products, he earns profit
from selling the national brand, which also competes with his own brand. Section 4.1 has
provided an intuition that when both product are in the market, a higher qn would lead to
a larger segment of demand for the national brand. As NB becomes more competitive, the
retailer potentially becomes more profitable from selling NB, but demand for SB might be
compromised. Meanwhile, it is easy to observe that when qn decreases, the retailer tends
to be charged with lower purchasing prices (wH∗, TH∗, wL∗, TL∗), which certainly diminishes
the profit earned from selling NB. Hence, as qn increases, the retailer’s benefit of holding
the private information could be enlarged or shrunk. Hence, the value of information to the
retailer could increase or decrease.
Note that the consumers evaluate a perceptional value for each product and make the
purchasing decision based on the combination of the product’s price and quality. It implies
that the exogenous parameters qn and qs have significant impacts on the demand and the
resulting profits for the supplier and the retailer. However, various combinations of cn, qn,
qs, c
H
s and c
L
s represent different vertical partnership and horizontal competition situation
between the supplier and retailer. In addition, we have analytically derived that qn and qs
appear in both the numerators and denominators of the profit functions and the value of
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Table 2.5: cn = 42, qn = 110, c
H
s = 51, c
L
s = 30, v = 0.228.
qs Vn |Vr|
67 0.894 0.883
77 1.132 1.132
87 1.236 1.223
97 1.060 0.944
information functions which certainly brings in the complexity in the sensitivity analysis. Our
numerical results show that as qn increases, the value of information for the supplier could
either increases or decrease, which can be demonstrated by an experiment with cn = 361, qs =
482, cHs = 343, c
L
s = 336, v = 0.309. As qn increases from 493 to 513 then to 533, Vn firstly
decreases from 3.42 to 0.32 then increases to 2.36. We also conduct numerical experiments
to observe the impact of the SB quality on the value of information to the supplier and the
retailer. Again, the results suggest that as qs increases, Vn and |Vr| could either increases or
decrease. The following experiment is with cn = 42, qn = 110, c
H
s = 51, c
L
s = 30, v = 0.228.
Table 2.5 summarizes the values of information for different values of qs varying from 67 to
97.
2.7 Conclusion
We analyzed a two-tier supply chain with a national brand supplier and a retailer who is
capable of developing his own SB to compete with the NB. The NB supplier offers a menu of
two-part tariff contracts to the retailer to distribute the NB products to consumers. Given
this supply contract, the retailer can decide whether to accept the contract and whether to
produce SB. In addition, the retailer holds private cost information of the store brand, for
which the NB supplier only has an estimate, i.e., high cost or low cost with certain prob-
ability. Due to the information asymmetry, a high-type retailer tends to mimic a low-type
78
in order to pay lower procurement prices to the supplier. We applied revelation principle to
design an optimal menu of contracts for the NB supplier to maximize her expected profit as
well as induce the retailer to truthfully reveal his private information. Moreover, we quan-
tify the value of information for each member as the difference between their optimal profits
under symmetric information and asymmetric information, and illustrate how product char-
acteristics (i.e., production cost and perceived quality) affect the value of information to
both the supplier and the retailer. First, when the NB unit production cost increases, the
private cost information becomes less valuable to both the supplier and the retailer. Second,
when the gap between the high-type and low-type costs increases, the supplier considers
the information to be more valuable, but the retailer’s value of information may increase
or decrease. Finally, we observed that when NB’s perceived quality increases, the value of
information to the retailer first decreases then increases, but the impact on the supplier’s
value of information can be positive or negative. In addition, our numerical results demon-
strated that the respective value of information to the supplier and retailer may increase
or decrease when SB’s perceived quality increases. Such observations may be attributed to
the complication caused by the two-dimensional relationship between the supplier and the
retailer as both partners and competitors.
There are numerous ways to extend this study. First, we assume that the supplier’s
estimate for SB production cost follows a discrete probability with two possible values. One
can generalize this assumption to study a realistic case where the possible cost values follow
a continuous distribution. The model formulated in Corbett et al. (2004) may provide
guidance in this direction. Second, we assume that the perceived quality of the SB is lower
than that of the NB. However, it comes to our attention that there are rising evidences
indicating that more consumers might perceive higher quality from some store brands than
national brands in certain categories; see, e.g., Hale (2011), Tuttle (2012), Bronnenberg et al.
(2015), Chung and Lee (2017). One can relax the assumption on quality values in a future
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study to investigate a more generalized case. Last but not the least, our model is formulated
based on an assumption that the NB supplier is the game leader. One can consider a retailer
to be the game leader and employ a signaling game framework to explore the interaction.
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2.A Appendix
Proof. Proposition 2.1 If w ≤ csqn
qs
, condition (1) is satisfied but condition (2) does not
hold. Thus the local maximum exists at the endpoints of the interval [pn− qn + qs, pnqsqn ]. We
have ΠIIr |ps= pnqsqn =
(qn−w)2
4qn
− T and ΠIIr |ps=pn−qn+qs=
(qs−cs)2
4qs
− T . Given w ≤ csqn
qs
, we have
0 < w
qn
≤ cs
qs
< 1 following which ΠIIr |ps= pnqsqn ≥ Π
II
r |ps=pn−qn+qs . Indeed, when w ≤
csqn
qs
, ΠIIr is
quasi-concave and monotonically increasing on ps within the closed interval [pn−qn+qs, pnqsqn ].
Hence, ΠII∗r exists at the upper endpoint of the interval, such that
ΠII∗r = Π
II
r |ps= pnqsqn =
(qn − w)2
4qn
− T = ΠI∗r
If w is in ( csqn
qs
, cs + qn− qs], both conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied. Then pII∗n =
w+qn
2
and
pII∗s =
cs+qs
2
are indeed the optimal solution. We can obtain the local optimum
ΠII∗r =
qn − w
2
[
1
2
− w − cs
2(qn − qs)
]
+
qs − cs
2
[
w − cs
2(qn − qs)
− cs
2qs
]
− T. (2.A.1)
If w > cs + qn − qs, we expect ΠII∗r to exist at the lower endpoint of the interval of ps such
that
ΠII∗r = Π
II∗
r |ps=pn−qn+qs=
(qs − cs)2
4qs
− T.
However, ΠII∗r |ps=pn−qn+qs< ΠIII∗r for any T > 0. Then if ps = pn− qn + qs, it is no longer
profitable for the retailer to carry both brands. Aware of such situation, we proceed to
search for the global optimal profit, i.e., Π∗r = max{ΠI∗r ,ΠII∗r ,ΠIII∗r }. The optimal profit is
compared pair-wisely among three local optima. We will illustrate that the global optimum
differentiates with respect to the contract parameters w and T offered by the national brand
supplier.
We have shown that when w ≤ csqn
qs
, Π∗r = Π
I∗
r and Π
I∗
r is monotonically decreasing on w.
For ΠIIr , if w =
csqn
qs
, pII∗s =
pII∗n qs
qn
,ΠII∗r = Π
II
r |pII∗s = p
II∗
n qs
qn
= ΠI∗r |w= csqnqs , that is Π
I∗
r and Π
II∗
r
are continuous on w at csqn
qs
.
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Note the lump-sum transfer is not applicable in the case III. When comparing ΠI∗r and
ΠIII∗r , we need to discuss how the retailer’s decision differentiates based on T . For any
w ≤ csqn
qs
, there exist a threshold transfer T̄ I(w) ≥ 0, such that ΠI∗r |T=T̄ I(w)= ΠIII∗r . We have
It follows from (2.4.3) that T̄ I |w=0= qn4 −
(qs−cs)2
4qs
and T̄ I |w= csqn
qs
= (qn−qs)(qs−cs)
2
4q2s
. Directly
differentiation on T̄ I(w)w.r.t. w, we have dT̄
I(w)
dw
= w−qn
2qn
< 0, i.e., T̄ I(w)decreases in w.
Hence, if the national brand supplier charges an wholesale price w ∈ [0, csqn
qs
] and a reasonable
fixed payment that lower than the threshold value T̄ I(w), it is more profitable for the retailer
to not introduce the SB and carry NB only; if the fixed payment is higher than the threshold,
it would be better off to only produce SB.
Given any w ∈ ( csqn
qs
, cs + qn − qs), we firstly compare ΠI∗r with ΠII∗r . We have proved
that ΠI∗r with Π
II∗
r are continuous at w =
csqn
qs
. After some algebra, we notice that ΠI∗r
with ΠII∗r are both monotonically decreasing on w, and
dΠII∗r (w)
dw
< dΠ
II∗
r (w)
dw
. Therefore, if
csqn
qs
< w ≤ cs + qn − qs, carrying both products is more profitable for the retailer. To
compare ΠII∗r with Π
III∗
r , we again use a threshold transfer T̄
II to determine whether to
carry the national brand. For any w ∈ ( csqn
qs
, cs + qn− qs], there exists a T̄ II(w) > 0 given by
(2.4.4), such that ΠII∗r |T=T̄ II(w)= ΠIII∗r . The value of T̄ II at the endpoints of the interval for
w can be easily obtained that T̄ II |w= csqn
qs
= (qn−qs)(qs−cs)
2
4q2s
and T̄ II |w=cs+qn−qs= 0. Take direct
derivative on T̄ II(w) w.r.t w, we have dT̄
II(w)
dw
= −1
2
+ w−cs
2(qn−qs) < 0.
Thus, for any w ∈ ( csqn
qs
, cs+qn−qs), if 0 ≤ T < T̄ II(w), Π∗r = ΠII∗r ; otherwise, Π∗r = ΠIII∗r .
When w > cs + qn − qs, we can directly claim that for any T > 0, it is never profitable
to carry NB, i.e., Π∗r = Π
III∗
r .
Proof. Lemma 2.1. Direct differentiation on ΠIr given by 2.A.1 with respect to pn yields
dΠIr
dpIn
= w+qn−2pn
qn
and d
2ΠIr
dpIn
2 = − 2qn < 0. Solving
dΠIr
dpIn
= 0, we can get pI∗n =
w+qn
2
. Substituting
pI∗n into Π
I
r, we have Π
I∗
r =
(qn−w)2
4qn
− T. The derivations of pIII∗s and ΠIII∗r are obtained in a
similar manner and omitted here.
86
Proof. Lemma 2.2. The occurrence of case I implies that 0 ≤ w ≤ csqn
qs
and 0 < T ≤ T̄ I(w)
given which the retailer will price NB as pI∗n . We can easily observe that Π
I
n is increasing in
T . Thus in the optimal contract, T ∗ = T̄ I(w). The retailer consequently gets the reservation
profit ΠIII∗r .
Substitute in pI∗n and T
∗ and taking direct differentiation on ΠIn with respect to w, we
have dΠ
I
n(w)
dw
= cn− w
2qn
and d
2ΠIn(w)
dw2
= − 1
2qn
< 0. We can obtain w∗ = cn from
dΠIn(w)
dw
= 0. If
cn ≤ csqnqs , then 0 ≤ w
∗ ≤ csqn
qs
is indeed satisfied. As a result, the retailer will choose to carry
the national brand only, i.e.,
ΠI∗n = Π
I
n|w=cn=
(qn − cn)2
4qn
− (qs − cs)
2
4qs
. (2.A.2)
If cn >
csqn
qs
, since the profit function is concave and decreasing on w for any w ≤ csqn
qs
, the
optimal solution exists at the endpoint of the interval, i.e., w∗ = csqn
qs
. We have
ΠI∗n = Π
I
n|w= csqn
qs
=
2(csqn − cnqs)(qs − cs) + (qn − qs)(qs − cs)2
4q2s
.
Case II: If the retailer decides to carry both products, then the national brand supplier’s
profit function is
max
(w,T )
ΠIIn = (w − cn)(1−
pn − ps
qn − qs
) + T (2.A.3)
Following the Proposition 1, the occurrence of case II suggests that csqn
qs
< w < cs+qn−qs
and 0 < T ≤ T̄ II(w) given which the retailer will set the retailer prices for NB and SB as
{pII∗n , pII∗s }. Similar to case I, we can easily verify that T ∗ = T̄ II(w) and the retailer only
earns the reservation profit ΠIII∗r .
After some algebra, we have w∗ = cn by solving
dΠIIn (w)
dw
= 0, noting d
2ΠIIn (w)
dw2
< 0. If
cn ≤ csqnqs , Π
II
n is quasi-concave and decreasing on w for any w ∈ (
csqn
qs
, cs + qn − qs]. w∗ is
then forced to take the left ending-point value of the interval, i.e., w∗ = csqn
qs
. Thus
ΠII∗n = Π
II
n |w= csqnqs =
2(csqn − cnqs)(qs − cs) + (qn − qs)(qs − cs)2
4q2s
= ΠIn|w= csqnqs
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If csqn
qs
< cn ≤ cs + qn − qs, w∗ = cn is indeed the optimal solution. Then we have
ΠII∗n = Π
II
n |w=cn=
(qn − cn − qs + cs)2
4(qn − qs)
. (2.A.4)
If cn > cs + qn − qs, w∗ then takes the value cs + qn − qs due to the quasi-concavity and
monotonicity on w in ( csqn
qs
, cs + qn − qs]. Thus,
ΠII∗n = Π
II
n |w=cs+qn−qs= 0.
In such extreme case that the national brand supplier’s production cost is too high, selling
products to the retailer is no longer a profitable option.
We compare the supplier’s profit among the three cases to seek her optimal profit, i.e
Π∗n = max{ΠI∗n , ΠII∗n , ΠIII∗n }, on various intervals of cn.
(1) If cn ≤ csqnqs , Π
I∗
n = Π
I
n|wI∗=cn , ΠII∗n = ΠIIn |wII∗= csqnqs . When we compare the expected profit
among the three case, we have that ΠI∗n − ΠII∗n =
(csqn−cnqs)2
4qnq2s
≥ 0, and ΠI∗n =
(qn−cn)2
4qn
−
(qs−cs)2
4qs
≥ 0 = ΠIIIn .
(2) If csqn
qs
< cn ≤ cs + qn − qs, ΠI∗n = ΠIn|wI∗= csqnqs , Π
II∗
n = Π
II
n |wII∗=cn . Again, we can easily
derive that ΠII∗n − ΠI∗n =
(csqn−cnqs)2
4q2s(qn−qs)
> 0 and ΠII∗n =
(qn−cn−qs+cs)2
4(qn−qs) ≥ 0 = Π
III
n .
(3) If cn > cs + qn− qs, ΠI∗n = ΠIn|wI∗= csqnqs , Π
II∗
n = Π
II
n |wII∗=cs+qn−qs= 0. By transforming ΠI∗n ,
we get ΠI∗n =
qs−cs
4qs2
[(csqn − cnqs) + qs(cs + qn − qs − cn)] < 0.
Given any cn > cs + qn− qs, we compare the profit functions cross three cases, obtaining
that ΠI∗n < Π
II∗
n = Π
III∗
n = 0.
Proof. Lemma 2.3. Proposition 2.1 implies that for any (w, T ) satisfies Πr(w, T, c
i
s) ≥
ΠIIIr (c
i
s) iff w ≤ cis + qn − qs and T ≤ T̄ i(w),∀i = L,H. Next, we want to show that
for any w ∈ [0, cLs + qn− qs] , we have ∆(w)
def
= T̄H(w)− T̄L(w) > 0 . It follows from ?? that
∆(w) have different forms in different ranges of w . Therefore, we consider the following
cases:
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(1) 0 ≤ w ≤ c
L
s qn
qs
. In conjunction with cLs < c
H
s , we have w <
cHs qn
qs
. Therefore, ??
implies that ∆(w) = T̄ IH(w)− T̄ IL(w) = (qs−c
L
s )
2−(qs−cHs )2
4qs
> 0.
(2) c
L
s qn
qs
< w ≤ cLs + qn−qs. We consider the following two sub-cases:
(2-i) If cLs + qn − qs ≤
cHs qn
qs
, then we have c
L
s qn
qs
< w ≤ cLs + qn − qs ≤
cHs qn
qs
< cHs + qn − qs.
Therefore, ?? implies that ∆(w) = T̄ IH(w) − T̄ IIL(w) = (qn−w)
2
4qn
− (qs−c
H
s )
2
4qs
− (c
L
s −w+qn−qs)2
4(qn−qs) .
Since ∂∆
∂w
= c
L
s qn−qsw
2q2n−2qnqs
< 0 for all w > c
L
s qn
qs
, it follows from ∆|w=cLs +qn−qs=
(qs−cLs )2
4qn
− (qs−c
H
s )
2
4qs
> 0
that ∆(w) > 0,∀w ∈ ( c
L
s qn
qs
, cLs + qn − qs].
(2-ii) If c
H
s qn
qs
< cLs + qn − qs, then we have
cLs qn
qs
< c
H
s qn
qs
< cLs + qn − qs < cHs + qn − qs.
For c
L
s qn
qs
< w ≤ c
H
s qn
qs
, (2-i) implies that ∆(w) = T̄ IH(w) − T̄ IIL(w) and ∂∆
∂w
< 0,∀w >
cLs qn
qs
. Moreover, ∆|
w=
cHs qn
qs
= (qs−c
H
s )
2(qn−qs)2−(cLs qs+qnqs−q2s−cHs qn)2
4(qn−qs)q2s
> 0. Hence, we show ∆(w) >
0,∀w ∈ ( c
L
s qn
qs
, c
H
s qn
qs
]. For w ∈ ( c
H
s qn
qs
, cLs + qn − qs], we have
∆ = T̄ IIH(w)− T̄ IIL(w) = (c
H
s −cLs )t(cHs +cLs +2qn−2qs−2w)
4t(qn−qs) > 0 due to c
L
s < c
H
s .
In summary, we have shown that T̄H(w) > T̄L(w), ∀w ∈ [0, cLs + qn − qs]. There-
fore, Proposition 1 implies that for any (wL, TL) that satisfies (I.R.L), we have wL ≤
cLs + qn − qs < cHs + qn − qs and TL ≤ T̄L(wL) < T̄H(wL), which implies such (wL, TL)
satisfies Πr(w
L, TL, cHs ) ≥ ΠIIIr (cHs ). Hence, we have Πr(wH , TH , cHs )
(I.C.H)
≥ Πr(wL, TL, cHs ) ≥
ΠIIIr (c
H
s ).
Proof. Lemma 2.4
We have proved that following (I.C.H.), (I.C.L.) and (I.R.L.), (I.R.H.) is redundant. We
now further show that under the (HII , LI) contract, (I.C.H.), (I.C.L.), (I.R.L.) and TH ≥ 0
cannot be simultaneously satisfied so that (HII , LI) contract is never feasible for the supplier.
By offering a (HII , LI) contract, the national brand supplier guides a retailer to carry
both brands if she is high type, and to carry the national brand only if she is low type.
It follows that wH ,TH , wL and TL must be priced according to Proposition 1, i.e., c
H
s qn
qs
<
wH ≤ cHs + qn−qs, TH ≤ T̄ IIH(wH), wL ≤
cLs qn
qs
, TL ≤ T̄ IL(wL). In conjunction with Lemma
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3, we can predict that if a high-type retailer lies about his type by choosing the (wL, TL),
he will react as carrying the national brand only, i.e., Πr(w
L, TL, cHs ) ≡ ΠIr(wL, TL, cHs ).
Hence, (I.C.H.) can be equivalently written as ΠIIr (w
H , TH , cHs ) ≥ ΠIr(wL, TL, cHs ), or
qn−wH
2
(1
2
− w
H−cHs
2(qn−qs)) +
qs−cHs
2
( w
H−cHs
2(qn−qs) −
cHs
2qs
)−TH ≥ (qn−w
L)
2
4qn
−TL. Rearranging the inequality,
we can obtain the relationship between TH and TL that TH − TL ≤ qn−wH
2
(1
2
− w
H−cHs
2(qn−qs)) +
qs−cHs
2
( w
H−cHs
2(qn−qs) −
cHs
2qs
)− (qn−w
L)
2
4qn
def
= ∆TU .
Together with TL ≤ T̄ IL(wL), TH ≤ qn−wH
2
(1
2
− w
H−cHs
2(qn−qs)) +
qs−cHs
2
( w
H−cHs
2(qn−qs) −
cHs
2qs
) −
(qs−cLs )
2
4qs
def
= T̂H . Since ∂ T̂
H
∂ wH
= w
H−cHs −qn+qs
2(qn−qs) ≤ 0, T̂
H ≤ T̂H |
wH=
cHs qn
qs
= qn(qs−c
H
s )
2−(qs−cLs )
2
qs
4q2s
.
If cLs + qn−qs <
cHs qn
qs
, then in conjunction with 1
qn
< 1
qs
, qn(qs−c
H
s )
2−(qs−cLs )
2
qs
4q2s
< 0 so that TH
has to satisfy TH < 0. In this case, (H II, LI) contract is not feasible. If c
H
s qn
qs
< cLs + qn−qs,
qn(qs−cHs )
2−(qs−cLs )
2
qs
4q2s
− T̄ IIL(wH) = − (c
H
s −cLs )(2wHqs−cHs qn−cLs qn)
4qs(qn−qs) ≤ 0. If w
H < cLs + qn−qs, then
according to Proposition 1 we can predict that if a low-type retailer chooses the high-type
contract, he would carry both brands, i.e., Πr(w
H , TH , cLs ) ≡ ΠIIr (wH , TH , cLs ). Further
checking (I.C.L.), if follows from ΠIr(w
L, TL, cLs ) ≥ ΠIIr (wH , TH , cLs ) that TH − TL ≥
qn−wH
2
(1
2
− w
H−cLs
2(qn−qs)) +
qs−cLs
2
( w
H−cLs
2(qn−qs) −
cLs
2qs
) − (qn−w
L)
2
4qn
def
=∆TD. However, ∆TU − ∆TD =
− (c
H
s −cLs )(2wHqs−cHs qn−cLs qn)
4qs(qn−qs) < 0, implying (I.C.H.) and (I.C.L.) cannot be simultaneously satis-
fied. If wH < cLs + qn−qs, TH ≤ T̂H ≤ T̂H |wH=cLs +qn−qs=
(cHs −cLs )(cHs qn+cLs qn−2(cLs +qn−qs)qs)
4(qn−qs)qs < 0.
Therefore, under the parameter setting c
H
s qn
qs
< cLs + qn−qs, (H II, LI) contract is not feasible
regardless of the value of wH .
Hence we have that (HII , LI) contract is not a feasible option for the supplier.
Proof. Lemma 2.5. Proposition 2.1 implies that a (w, T ) contract, from which a retailer will
earn a profit no less than his reservation profit ΠIIIr (c
i
s), must satisfy w ≤ cis + qn − qs and
T ≤ T̄ i(w),∀i = L,H. We now define ∆(w) def= T̄H(w)− T̄L(w) for any w ∈ [0, cLs + qn− qs].
It follows from (2.5.3) that ∆(w) has different forms in different ranges of w. Therefore, we
consider the following cases:
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(1) If 0 ≤ w ≤ c
L
s qn
qs
, then it follows from cLs < c
H
s that w ≤
cLs qn
qs
. Therefore, equation
(2.5.3) implies that ∆(w) = T̄ IH(w)− T̄ IL(w) = (qs−c
L
s )
2−(qs−cHs )2
4qs
> 0.
(2) If c
L
s qn
qs
< w ≤ cLs + qn − qs, then the following two parameter settings should be
discussed separately.
(2-i) Under the parameter setting cLs + qn− qs ≤
cHs qn
qs
, we have c
L
s qn
qs
< w ≤ cLs + qn− qs ≤
cHs qn
qs
< cHs + qn − qs. Therefore, equation (2.5.3) implies that ∆(w) = T̄ IH(w)− T̄ IIL(w) =
(qn−w)2
4qn
− (qs−c
H
s )
2
4qs
− (c
L
s −w+qn−qs)2
4(qn−qs) . Since
∂∆(w)
∂w
= c
L
s qn−qsw
2q2n−2qnqs
< 0 for all w > c
L
s qn
qs
, it follows
from ∆(w)|w=cLs +qn−qs=
(qs−cLs )2
4qn
− (qs−c
H
s )
2
4qs
> 0 that ∆(w) > 0,∀w ∈ ( c
L
s qn
qs
, cLs + qn − qs].
(2-ii) Under the parameter setting c
H
s qn
qs
< cLs + qn − qs, we naturally have
cLs qn
qs
< c
H
s qn
qs
<
cLs + qn − qs < cHs + qn − qs. For
cLs qn
qs
< w ≤ c
H
s qn
qs
, (2-i) has shown that ∆(w) = T̄ IH(w) −
T̄ IIL(w) and ∂∆
∂w
< 0,∀w > c
L
s qn
qs
.Moreover, ∆(w)|
w=
cHs qn
qs
= (qs−c
H
s )
2(qn−qs)2−(cLs qs+qnqs−q2s−cHs qn)2
4(qn−qs)q2s
>
0. Hence, we obtain ∆(w) > 0,∀w ∈ ( c
L
s qn
qs
, c
H
s qn
qs
]. For c
H
s qn
qs
< w ≤ cLs + qn − qs, we have
∆(w) = T̄ IIH(w)− T̄ IIL(w) = (c
H
s −cLs )t(cHs +cLs +2qn−2qs−2w)
4t(qn−qs) > 0 due to c
L
s < c
H
s .
Hence, we have that T̄H(w) > T̄L(w),∀w ∈ [0, cLs + qn − qs].
Proof. Proposition 2.2
Under each parameter setting, we compare the local optima from each subcontract option
throughout all the intervals of cn. (I.R.L.) constraint was set to be binding at the optimality,
implying that a low-type retailer will only obtain his reservation profit, i.e., Πr(w
L, TL, cLs ) =
ΠIIIr (c
L
s ). Consequently, (I.C.L.) can be rewritten as Π
III
r (c
L
s ) ≥ Πr(wH , TH , cLs ). In order
to check the feasibility of the optimal solution in the (I.C.L.) constraint, it follows the
Proposition 1 that if wH∗ ≤ c
L
s qn
qs
and TH∗ ≥ T̄ IL(wH∗), or c
L
s qn
qs
< wH∗ ≤ cLs + qn−qs and
TH∗ ≥ T̄ IIL(wH∗), or wH∗ > cLs + qn−qs and TH∗ > 0, then (I.C.L) is satisfied. We will
show that with substituting the resulting optimal parameters (wH∗, TH∗), (wL∗, TL∗) into
(I.C.L), (I.C.L) is indeed satisfied.
1. cLs + qn−qs <
cHs qn
qs
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(1-i) If cn ≤ c
L
s qn
qs
, Π∗n(H
I , LI) − Π∗n(HI , LII) =
(1−v)(cLs qn−cnqs)
2
4qnq2s
≥ 0; Π∗n(HI , LII) −
Π∗n(H
II , LII) = v(c
H
s qn−cnqs)
2
4qnq2s
> 0. Hence, (HI , LI) contract is more profitable, and wH∗ =
cn, T
H∗ = (qn−cn)
2
4qn
− (qs−c
L
s )
2
4qs
, wL∗ = cn, T
L∗ = (qn−cn)
2
4qn
− (qs−c
L
s )
2
4qs
. Since wH∗ = cn ≤ c
L
s qn
qs
,
TH∗ − T̄ IL(wH∗) = 0, (I.C.L.) is satisfied and binding at optimality.
(1-ii) If c
L
s qn
qs
< cn <
(cLs +qn−qs)[(1−v)qn−vqs]+vcLs qn
(1−v)qn ,Π
∗
n(H
I , LII)−Π∗n(HI , LI) =
(1−v)2qn(cLs qn−cnqs)2
4(qn−qs)q2s((1−v)qn−vqs)
>
0; Π∗n(H
I , LII)−Π∗n(HII , LII) =
v(cHs qn−cnqs)2
4qnq2s
> 0. Therefore, (HI , LII) contract is more prof-
itable, and wL∗ = (cn−vcn−vc
L
s )qn
qn−vqn−vqs , T
L∗ =
(cLs +qn−qs−
(cn−vcn−vcLs )qn
qn−vqn−vqs
)
2
4(qn−qs) , w
H∗ = cn, T
H∗ = (qn−cn)
2
4qn
−
(qn−
(cn−vcn−vcLs )qn
qn−vqn−vqs
)
2
4qn
+
(cLs +qn−qs−
(cn−vcn−vcLs )qn
qn−vqn−vqs
)
2
4(qn−qs) . Since w
H∗ = cn and
cLs qn
qs
< cn < c
L
s +qn−qs, we
compare TH∗ with T̄ IIL(wH∗) and obtain TH∗ − T̄ IIL(wH∗) = v(2(1−v)qn−vqs)(c
L
s qn−cnqs)
2
4qn(qn−qs)((1−v)qn−vqs)2
> 0.
(I.C.L.) is satisfied.
(1-iii) If (c
L
s +qn−qs)((1−v)qn−vqs)+vcLs qn
(1−v)qn < cn ≤ c
L
s + qn − qs, Π∗n(HI , LII) − Π∗n(HI , LI) =
v(qs−cLs )
2
(qn−qs)
4qnqs
− (1−v)(qs−c
L
s )((qn−qs−2cn)qs+cLs (qn+qs))
4q2s
≥ (qs−c
L
s )
2
(qn−qs)((1−v)qn−vqs)
4qnq2s
> 0, Π∗n(H
I , LII)−
Π∗n(H
II , LII) = v(c
H
s qn−cnqs)
2
4qnq2s
> 0. Hence, (HI , LII) contract is more profitable,
wH∗ = cn, T
H∗ =
(qn − cn)2
4qn
− (qs − c
L
s )
2
4qn
,
wL∗ = cLs + qn − qs, TL∗ = 0.
Since wH∗ = cn and
cLs qn
qs
< cn ≤ cLs + qn − qs, we compare TH∗ with T̄ IIL(wH∗), resulting
in that TH∗ − T̄ IIL(wH∗) = (c
L
s +qn−qs−cn)(cnqs−cLs qn+(qn−qs)(qs−cLs ))
4qn(qn−qs) ≥ 0. Therefore, (I.C.L.) is
satisfied.
2. c
H
s qn
qs
< cLs + qn − qs
(2-i) If cn ≤ c
L
s qn
qs
, Π∗n(H
I , LI)−Π∗n(HI , LII :
cLs qn
qs
< wL <
cHs qn
qs
)= (1−v)(c
L
s qn−cnqs)
2
4qnq2s
>
0; Π∗n(H
I , LII :
cLs qn
qs
< wL <
cHs qn
qs
) − Π∗n(HI , LII :
cHs qn
qs
< wL < cLs + qn−qs) =
(cHs −cLs )qn(cLs ((1−v)qn+vqs)+cHs ((1−v)qn−vqs)−2(1−v)cnqs)
4q2s(qn−qs)
≥ (c
H
s −cLs )
2
qn((1−v)qn−vqs)
4(qn−qs)q2s
> 0; Π∗n(H
I , LII :
cLs qn
qs
< wL <
cHs qn
qs
) − Π∗n(HII , LII :
cLs qn
qs
< wL <
cHs qn
qs
) = v(c
H
s qn−cnqs)
2
4qnq2s
> 0; Π∗n(H
I , LII :
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cHs qn
qs
< wL < cLs + qn−qs) − Π∗n(HII , LII :
cHs qn
qs
< wL < cLs + qn−qs) =
v(cHs qn−cnqs)
2
4qnq2s
> 0.
Hence, (HI , LI) contract is the most profitable contract among six options, and
wH∗ = cn, T
H∗ =
(qn − cn)2
4qn
− (qs − c
L
s )
2
4qs
,
wL∗ = cn, T
L∗ =
(qn − cn)2
4qn
− (qs − c
L
s )
2
4qs
.
Since wH∗ = cn ≤ c
L
s qn
qs
, TH∗ − T̄ IL(wH∗) = 0, (I.C.L.) is satisfied and binding at optimality.
(2-ii) If
cLs qn
qs
< cn ≤ c
H
s qn
qs
− v(c
H
s −cLs )
1−v , Π
∗
n(H
I , LII : c
L
s qn
qs
< wL < c
H
s qn
qs
) − Π∗n(HI , LI) =
(1−v)2qn(cnqs−cLs qn)
2
4(qn−qs)q2s((1−v)qn−vqs)
> 0; Π∗n(H
I , LII : c
L
s qn
qs
< wL < c
H
s qn
qs
) − Π∗n(HI , LII :
cHs qn
qs
< wL <
cLs + qn − qs) =
qn(((1−v)cn−vcLs )qs+cHs ((1−v)qn−vqs))
2
4(qn−qs)q2s((1−v)qn−vqs)
> 0; Π∗n(H
I , LII : c
L
s qn
qs
< wL < c
H
s qn
qs
) −
Π∗n(H
II , LII : c
L
s qn
qs
< wL < c
H
s qn
qs
) = v(c
H
s qn−cnqs)
2
4qnq2s
> 0; Π∗n(H
II , LII : c
L
s qn
qs
< wL < c
H
s qn
qs
) −
Π∗n(H
II , LII : c
H
s qn
qs
< wL < cLs + qn − qs) =
qn(((1−v)cn−vcLs )qs+cHs ((1−v)qn−vqs))
2
4(qn−qs)q2s((1−v)qn−vqs)
> 0. Therefore,
in this case, (HI , LII : c
L
s qn
qs
< wL < c
H
s qn
qs
) is the most profitable option for the national
brand supplier, and
wH∗ = cn, T
H∗ =
(qn − cn)2
4qn
−
(qn − (cn−vcn−vc
L
s )qn
qn−vqn−vqs )
2
4qn
+
(cLs + qn − qs −
(cn−vcn−vcLs )qn
qn−vqn−vqs )
2
4(qn − qs)
,
wL∗ =
(cn − vcn − vcLs )qn
qn − vqn − vqs
, TL∗ =
(cLs + qn − qs −
(cn−vcn−vcLs )qn
qn−vqn−vqs )
2
4(qn − qs)
.
Since wH∗ = cn and
cLs qn
qs
< cn < c
L
s + qn − qs, we compare TH∗ with T̄ IIL(wH∗) and obtain
TH∗ − T̄ IIL(wH∗) = v(2(1−v)qn−vqs)(c
L
s qn−cnqs)
2
4qn(qn−qs)((1−v)qn−vqs)2
> 0, implying that (I.C.L.) is satisfied.
(2-iii) If c
H
s qn
qs
− v(c
H
s −cLs )
1−v < cn ≤
cHs qn
qs
, Π∗n(H
I , LII : c
H
s qn
qs
< wL < cLs +qn−qs)−Π∗n(HI , LII :
cLs qn
qs
< wL < c
H
s qn
qs
) = (((1−v)cn−vc
L
s )qs−cHs ((1−v)qn−vqs))
2
4q2s(1−v)(qn−qs)
> 0; Π∗n(H
I , LII : c
L
s qn
qs
< wL < c
H
s qn
qs
) −
Π∗n(H
I , LI) = (c
H
s −cLs )qn(2(1−v)cnqs−cLs ((1−v)qn+vqs)−cHs ((1−v)qn−vqs))
4(qn−qs)q2s
≥ (c
H
s −cLs )
2
qn((1−v)qn−vqs)
4(qn−qs)q2s
> 0;
Π∗n(H
I , LII : c
L
s qn
qs
< wL < c
H
s qn
qs
) − Π∗n(HII , LII :
cLs qn
qs
< wL < c
H
s qn
qs
) = v(c
H
s qn−cnqs)
2
4qnq2s
> 0;
Π∗n(H
I , LII : c
H
s qn
qs
< wL < cLs + qn − qs) − Π∗n(HII , LII :
cHs qn
qs
< wL < cLs + qn − qs) =
v(cHs qn−cnqs)
2
4qnq2s
> 0. Therefore, (HI , LII : c
H
s qn
qs
< wL < cLs + qn − qs) is the most profitable
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option for the national brand supplier, and
wH∗ = cn,
TH∗ =
(qn − cn)2
4qn
+
(cLs + qn − qs − (cn +
v(cHs −cLs )
1−v ))
2
4(qn − qs)
− [
qn − (cn + v(c
H
s −cLs )
1−v )
2
(
1
2
−
cn +
v(cHs −cLs )
1−v − c
H
s
2(qn − qs)
) +
qs − cHs
2
(
cn +
v(cHs −cLs )
1−v − c
H
s
2(qn − qs)
− c
H
s
2qs
)],
wL∗ = cn +
v(cHs − cLs )
1− v
, TL∗ =
(cLs + qn − qs − (cn +
v(cHs −cLs )
1−v ))
2
4(qn − qs)
.
Since wH∗ = cn and
cLs qn
qs
< cn < c
L
s + qn − qs, we compare TH∗ with T̄ IIL(wH∗), having
TH∗ − T̄ IIL(wH∗) = 2((1−v)cnc
H
s +v(c
H
s −cLs )
2
)qnqs−(1−v)(cHs
2
q2n+c
2
nq
2
s)
4(1−v)(qn−qs)qnqs , which increases on cn. As a
result, TH∗ − T̄ IIL(wH∗) ≥ (TH∗ − T̄ IIL(wH∗))|
cn=
cHs qn
qs
− v(c
H
s −cLs )
1−v
= v(c
H
s −cLs )
2
(2(1−v)qn−vqs)
4(1−v)2qn(qn−qs)
> 0.
(I.C.L.) constraint is satisfied.
In a summary for (2-ii) and (2-iii), for any cn ∈ ( c
L
s qn
qs
, c
H
s qn
qs
) , (HI , LII) is the most
profitable contract for the supplier.
(2-iv) If c
H
s qn
qs
< cn < c
L
s + qn − qs −
v(cHs −cLs )
1−v , Π
∗
n(H
II , LII : c
H
s qn
qs
< wL < cLs + qn −
qs) − Π∗n(HI , LII :
cHs qn
qs
< wL < cLs + qn − qs) =
v(cHs qn−cnqs)
2
4q2s(qn−qs)
> 0; Π∗n(H
II , LII : c
H
s qn
qs
<
wL < cLs + qn − qs)− Π∗n(HII , LII :
cLs qn
qs
< wL < c
H
s qn
qs
) = (((1−v)cn−vc
L
s )qs−cHs ((1−v)qn−vqs))
2
4(1−v)(qn−qs)q2s
> 0;
Π∗n(H
II , LII : c
L
s qn
qs
< wL < c
H
s qn
qs
) − Π∗n(HI , LII :
cLs qn
qs
< wL < c
H
s qn
qs
) = v(c
H
s qn−cnqs)
2
4q2s(qn−qs)
> 0;
Π∗n(H
II , LII : c
L
s qn
qs
< wL < c
H
s qn
qs
) − Π∗n(HI , LI) ≥
v(cHs qn−cnqs)
2
4(qn−qs)q2s
+ (c
H
s −cLs )
2
qn((1−v)qn+vqs)
4(qn−qs)q2s
> 0.
Therefore, (HII , LII : c
H
s qn
qs
< wL < cLs + qn− qs) is most profitable contract for the supplier,
and
wH∗ = cn, T
H∗ =
cLs
2
+ (cn − qn + qs)2 + 2cLs (qn − qs − (cn +
v(cHs −cLs )
1−v )) +
2vcHs (c
H
s −cLs )
1−v
4(qn − qs)
w∗L = cn +
v(cHs − cLs )
1− v
, TL∗ =
(cLs + qn − qs − (cn +
v(cHs −cLs )
1−v ))
2
4(qn − qs)
.
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Since wH∗ = cn and
cLs qn
qs
< cn < c
L
s + qn − qs, we compare TH∗ with T̄ IIL(wH∗) and obtain
TH∗ − T̄ IIL(wH∗) = v(c
H
s −cLs )
2
2(1−v)(qn−qs) > 0, which implies that (I.C.L.) is satisfied.
(2-v) If cLs + qn − qs −
v(cHs −cLs )
1−v < cn < c
L
s + qn − qs, Π∗n(HII , LII :
cHs qn
qs
< wL <
cLs + qn− qs)−Π∗n(HII , LII :
cLs qn
qs
< wL < c
H
s qn
qs
) ≥ (1−vt)(qs(c
L
s +qn−qs)−cHs qn)
2
4(qn−qs)q2s
> 0; Π∗n(H
II , LII :
cLs qn
qs
< wL < c
H
s qn
qs
) − Π∗n(HI , LI) ≥
v(cHs qn−cnqs)
2
4q2s(qn−qs)
+ (c
H
s −cLs )
2
qn((1−v)qn+vqs)
4(qn−qs)q2s
> 0; Π∗n(H
II , LII :
cHs qn
qs
< wL < cLs + qn − qs) − Π∗n(HI , LII :
cHs qn
qs
< wL < cLs + qn − qs) =
v(cHs qn−cnqs)
2
4q2s(qn−qs)
> 0;
Π∗n(H
II , LII : c
L
s qn
qs
< wL < c
H
s qn
qs
) − Π∗n(HI , LII :
cLs qn
qs
< wL < c
H
s qn
qs
) = v(c
H
s qn−cnqs)
2
4q2s(qn−qs)
> 0.
Hence, in this case, (HII , LII : c
H
s qn
qs
< wL < cLs + qn − qs) is most profitable contract for the
supplier;
wH∗ = cn, T
H∗ =
v(cLs + qn − qs − cn)(2cHs − cLs + qn − qs − cn)
4(qn − qs)
,
wL∗ = cLs + qn − qs, TL∗ = 0.
Since wH∗ = cn and
cLs qn
qs
< cn < c
L
s + qn − qs, we compare TH∗ with T̄ IIL(wH∗) and obtain
TH∗ − T̄ IIL(wH∗) = (c
H
s −cLs )(cLs +qn−qs−cn)
2(qn−qs) > 0, which verifies that (I.C.L.) is satisfied.
From (ii-4) and (ii-5), we obtain that for any cn ∈ ( c
H
s qn
qs
, cLs + qn − qs] , (HII , LII) is the
most profitable contract for the national brand supplier.
In summary, throughout all the possible parameter settings of cHs , c
L
s and cn, (I.C.L.) is
automatically satisfied by the optimal solution.
Proof. Proposition 2.3.
We present and compare the values of information to each entity throughout all possible
parameter settings as follows.
Under the parameter setting cLs + qn − qs <
cHs qn
qs
1 If cn ≤ c
L
s qn
qs
, Vr = v(
(qs−cHs )
2
4qs
− (qs−c
L
s )
2
4qs
) and Vn = v(
(qs−cLs )
2
4qs
− (qs−c
H
s )
2
4qs
). It is easy to
obtain Vn − |Vr|= 0.
2 If c
L
s qn
qs
< cn ≤ (c
L
s +qn−qs)((1−v)qn−vqs)+vcLs qn
(1−v)qn , Vr = v(
(qs−cHs )
2
4qs
− (qn−
(cn−vcn−vcLs )qn
qn−vqn−vqs
)
2
4qn
+
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(cLs +qn−qs−
(cn−vcn−vcLs )qn
qn−vqn−vqs
)
2
4(qn−qs) ) and Vn = v[
(qn−
(cn−vcn−vcLs )qn
qn−vqn−vqs
)
2
4qn
− (qs−c
H
s )
2
4qs
]+(1−v)[ (qn−cn−qs+c
L
s )
2
4(qn−qs) −
( (cn−vcn−vc
L
s )qn
qn−vqn−vqs − cn)(
1
2
−
(cn−vcn−vcLs )qn
qn−vqn−vqs
−cLs
2(qn−qs) )] −
(cLs −
(cn−vcn−vcLs )qn
qn−vqn−vqs
+qn−qs)
2
4(qn−qs) . It follows that
Vn − |Vr|= (1−v)v
2(cnqs−cLs qn)
2
4(qn−qs)(qn−vqn−vqs)2
> 0.
3 If (c
L
s +qn−qs)((1−v)qn−vqs)+vcLs qn
(1−v)qn < cn ≤ c
L
s + qn − qs, then Vr = v(
(qs−cHs )
2
4qs
− (qs−c
L
s )
2
4qn
) and
Vn = v(
(qs−cLs )
2
4qn
− (qs−c
H
s )
2
4qs
)+(1−v) (qn−cn−qs+c
L
s )
2
4(qn−qs) . Thus, Vn−|Vr|= (1−v)
(cLs +qn−qs−cn)
2
4(qn−qs) ≥
0.
Under the parameter setting c
H
s qn
qs
< cLs + qn − qs
1 If cn ≤ c
L
s qn
qs
, Vr = v(
(qs−cHs )
2
4qs
− (qs−c
L
s )
2
4qs
) and Vn = v(
(qs−cLs )
2
4qs
− (qs−c
H
s )
2
4qs
). Then we have
Vn − |Vr|= 0.
2 If c
L
s qn
qs
< cn ≤ c
H
s qn
qs
−v(c
H
s −cLs )
1−v , Vr = v(
(qs−cHs )
2
4qs
− (qn−
(cn−vcn−vcLs )qn
qn−vqn−vqs
)
2
4qn
+
(cLs +qn−qs−
(cn−vcn−vcLs )qn
qn−vqn−vqs
)
2
4(qn−qs) )
and Vn = v[
(qn−cn)2
4qn
− (qs−c
H
s )
2
4qs
+
(qn−
(cn−vcn−vcLs )qn
qn−vqn−vqs
)
2
4qn
]+(1−v)[ (qn−cn−qs+c
L
s )
2
4(qn−qs) −(
(cn−vcn−vcLs )qn
qn−vqn−vqs −
cn)(
1
2
−
(cn−vcn−vcLs )qn
qn−vqn−vqs
−cLs
2(qn−qs) )]−
(cLs +qn−qs−
(cn−vcn−vcLs )qn
qn−vqn−vqs
)
2
4(qn−qs) . After some algebra, we can show
that Vn − |Vr|= (1−v)v
2(cnqs−cLs qn)
2
4(qn−qs)(qn−vqn−vqs)2
> 0.
3 If c
H
s qn
qs
−v(c
H
s −cLs )
1−v < cn ≤ c
L
s +qn−qs−
v(cHs −cLs )
1−v , Vr =
v(cHs −cLs )(2(1−v)(cn−qn+qs)−(1−3v)cHs −cLs −vcLs )
4(1−v)(qn−qs)
and Vn = −v(c
H
s −cLs )(2(1−v)(cn−qn+qs)−(1−2v)cHs −cLs )
4(1−v)(qn−qs) . It follows that Vn−|Vr|=
v2(cHs −cLs )
2
4(1−v)(qn−qs) >
0.
4 If cLs +qn−qs−
v(cHs −cLs )
1−v < cn ≤ c
L
s +qn−qs, Vr = −
v(cHs −cLs )
2
4(qn−qs) and Vn = v
(cHs +qn−qs−cn)
2
4(qn−qs) +
(1−v) (c
L
s +qn−qs−cn)
2
4(qn−qs) −
v(cn−cLs −qn+qs)(cn−2cHs +cLs −qn+qs)
4(qn−qs) . Thus, Vn−|Vr|= (1−v)
(cLs +qn−qs−cn)
2
4(qn−qs) ≥
0.
Hence, we have that Vn ≥ |Vr| holds throughout all the parameter settings.
Proof. Proposition 2.4.
As the value of information has different forms depending on the value of cn, the impact of
cn on |Vr| and Vn is discussed for each parameter setting and interval of cn.
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(1) Parameter Setting 1: cLs + qn − qs <
cHs qn
qs
For the retailer, if cn ≤ c
L
s qn
qs
, ∂|Vr|
∂cn
= 0; if c
L
s qn
qs
< cn <
(cLs +qn−qs)((1−v)qn−vqs)+vcLs qn
(1−v)qn ,
∂|Vr|
∂cn
= − (1−v)
2vqn(cnqs−cLs qn)
2(qn−qs)((1−v)qn−vqs)2
< 0; if (c
L
s +qn−qs)((1−v)qn−vqs)+vcLs qn
(1−v)qn < cn < c
L
s +qn−qs,
∂|Vr|
∂cn
= 0.
For the supplier, if cn ≤ c
L
s qn
qs
, ∂Vn
∂cn
= 0; if c
L
s qn
qs
< cn <
(cLs +qn−qs)((1−v)qn−vqs)+vcLs qn
(1−v)qn ,
∂Vn
∂cn
= (1−v)v(c
L
s qn−cnqs)
2(qn−qs)((1−v)qn−vqs) < 0; if
(cLs +qn−qs)((1−v)qn−vqs)+vcLs qn
(1−v)qn < cn < c
L
s + qn − qs, ∂Vn∂cn =
(1−v)(cn−cLs −qn+qs)
2(qn−qs) < 0.
(2) Parameter Setting 2: c
H
s qn
qs
< cLs + qn − qs
For the retailer, if cn ≤ c
L
s qn
qs
, ∂|Vr|
∂cn
= 0; if c
L
s qn
qs
< cn <
cHs qn
qs
−v(c
H
s −cLs )
1−v ,
∂|Vr|
∂cn
= (1−v)
2vqn(cLs qn−cnqs)
2(qn−qs)((1−v)qn−vqs)2
<
0; if c
H
s qn
qs
− v(c
H
s −cLs )
1−v < cn < c
L
s +qn−qs−
v(cHs −cLs )
1−v ,
∂|Vr|
∂cn
= v(c
L
s −cHs )
2(qn−qs) < 0; if c
L
s +qn−qs−
v(cHs −cLs )
1−v <
cn < c
L
s + qn − qs,
∂|Vr|
∂cn
= 0.
For the supplier, if cn ≤ c
L
s qn
qs
, ∂Vn
∂cn
= 0; if
cLs qn
qs
< cn <
cHs qn
qs
− v(c
H
s −cLs )
1−v ,
∂Vn
∂cn
=
v(1−v)(cLs qn−cnqs)
2(qn−qs)((1−v)qn−vqs) < 0; if
cHs qn
qs
− v(c
H
s −cLs )
1−v < cn < c
L
s + qn − qs −
v(cHs −cLs )
1−v ,
∂Vn
∂cn
= v(c
L
s −cHs )
2(qn−qs) < 0;
if cLs + qn − qs −
v(cHs −cLs )
1−v < cn < c
L
s + qn − qs, ∂Vn∂cn =
(1−v)(cn−cLs −qn+qs)
2(qn−qs) < 0.
Proof. Proposition 2.5
(1) Parameter Setting 1: cLs + qn − qs <
cHs qn
qs
If cn ≤ c
L
s qn
qs
, ∂Vn
∂cHs
= v(qs−c
H
s )
2qs
> 0, ∂Vn
∂cLs
= v(c
L
s −qs)
2qs
< 0; if c
L
s qn
qs
< cn <
(cLs +qn−qs)((1−v)qn−vqs)+vcLs qn
(1−v)qn ,
∂Vn
∂cHs
= v(qs−c
H
s )
2qs
> 0, ∂Vn
∂cLs
= v((1−v)cnqn−c
L
s (qn−vqs)−(qn−qs)((1−v)qn−vqs))
2(qn−qs)((1−v)qn−vqs) < 0; if
(cLs +qn−qs)((1−v)qn−vqs)+vcLs qn
(1−v)qn <
cn < c
L
s + qn − qs, ∂Vn∂cHs =
v(qs−cHs )
2qs
> 0, ∂Vn
∂cLs
= (1−v)(c
L
s +qn−qs−cn)
2(qn−qs) −
v(qs−cLs )
2qn
< 0.
(2) Parameter Setting 2: c
H
s qn
qs
< cLs + qn − qs
If cn ≤ c
L
s qn
qs
, ∂Vn
∂cHs
= v(qs−c
H
s )
2qs
> 0, ∂Vn
∂cLs
= v(c
L
s −qs)
2qs
< 0; if c
L
s qn
qs
< cn <
cHs qn
qs
− v(c
H
s −cLs )
1−v ,
∂Vn
∂cHs
= v(qs−c
H
s )
2qs
> 0, ∂Vn
∂cLs
= v((1−v)cnqn−c
L
s (qn−vqs)−(qn−qs)((1−v)qn−vqs))
2(qn−qs)((1−v)qn−vqs) < 0; if
cHs qn
qs
− v(c
H
s −cLs )
1−v ≤
cn < c
L
s + qn − qs −
v(cHs −cLs )
1−v ,
∂Vn
∂cHs
= v((1−2v)c
H
s −(1−v)cn+vcLs +qn−vqn−qs+vqs)
2(1−v)(qn−qs) > 0,
∂Vn
∂cLs
=
−v(qn−vqn−qs+vqs−(1−v)cn−vc
H
s +c
L
s )
2(1−v)(qn−qs) < 0; if c
L
s + qn − qs −
v(cHs −cLs )
1−v ≤ cn < c
L
s + qn − qs,
∂Vn
∂ cHs
= v(c
H
s −cLs )
2(qn−qs) > 0,
∂Vn
∂ cLs
= qn−vqn−qs+vqs−(1−v)cn−vc
H
s +c
L
s
2(qn−qs) < 0.
Example 1: Under parameter setting c
H
s qn
qs
< cLs + qn − qs, if
cHs qn
qs
− v(c
H
s −cLs )
1−v < cn ≤
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cLs + qn − qs −
v(cHs −cLs )
1−v ,
∂|Vr|
∂cHs
= −v((1−v)(cn−c
H
s −qn+qs)+2v(cHs −cLs ))
2(1−v)(qn−qs) , directly following that
∂|Vr|
∂cHs
decreases on cn. Then for any cn ∈ ( c
H
s qn
qs
− v(c
H
s −cLs )
1−v , c
L
s + qn−qs −
v(cHs −cLs )
1−v ],
∂|Vr|
∂cHs
≤
∂|Vr|
∂cHs
|
cn=
cHs qn
qs
− v(c
H
s −cLs )
1−v
= 1
2
v(1 − c
H
s
qs
− v(c
H
s −cLs )
(1−v)(qn−qs)). Directly following
cHs qn
qs
< cLs + qn − qs −
v(cHs −cLs )
1−v , we have
v(cHs −cLs )
1−v < c
L
s +qn−qs−
cHs qn
qs
. With some algebra, we have that 1
2
v(1− c
H
s
qs
−
v(cHs −cLs )
(1−v)(qn−qs)) >
1
2
v( (c
L
s +qn−qs)qs−cHs qn+(qs−cHs )(qn−qs)
qs(qn−qs) ) > 0, resulting in
∂|Vr|
∂cHs
|
cn=
cHs qn
qs
− v(c
H
s −cLs )
1−v
> 0.
However, ∂|Vr|
∂cHs
|
cn=cLs +qn−qs−
v(cHs −cLs )
1−v
= v(1−2v)(c
H
s −cLs )
2(1−v)(qn−qs) in which the sign depends on the value
of v, the probability of high type. It leads to that |Vr| consistently increases on cHs ∀cn ∈
( c
H
s qn
qs
− v(c
H
s −cLs )
1−v , c
L
s + qn − qs −
v(cHs −cLs )
1−v ] iff v ≤
1
2
; otherwise, if v > 1
2
, then there is a unique
c̃n such that if
cHs qn
qs
− v(c
H
s −cLs )
1−v < cn ≤ c̃n, then
∂|Vr|
∂cHs
≥ 0; if c̃n < cn ≤ cLs + qn− qs−
v(cHs −cLs )
1−v ,
then ∂|Vr|
∂cHs
< 0. Hence, |Vr| could either increase or decrease on cHs depending on v and cn.
Example 2: Under parameter setting c
H
s qn
qs
< cLs + qn−qs, if
cLs qn
qs
< cn <
cHs qn
qs
− v(c
H
s −cLs )
1−v ,
∂|Vr|
∂ cLs
= v((1−v)
2cnq2n−(qn−qs)((1−v)qn−vqs)
2−cLs ((1−v2)q2n−(2−v)vqnqs+v2q2s))
2(qn−qs)((1−v)qn−vqs)2
. It is easy to observe that
∂|Vr|
∂cLs
monotonically increases on cn. Thus
∂|Vr|
∂cLs
> ∂|Vr|
∂cLs
|
cn=
cLs qn
qs
= v(c
L
s −qs)
2qs
so that ∂|Vr|
∂cLs
|
cn=
cLs qn
qs
=
v(cLs −qs)
2qs
< 0. Also, ∂|Vr|
∂cLs
≤ ∂|Vr|
∂cLs
|
cn=
cHs qn
qs
− v(c
H
s −cLs )
1−v
= v(qn(c
H
s qn−qs(cLs +qn−qs))+v(qs(q2n−qs(qs−cLs ))−cHs q2n))
2(qn−qs)qs((1−v)qn−vqs) .
In conjunction with c
H
s qn
qs
< cLs + qn − qs, we have that qn(cHs qn − qs(cLs + qn − qs)) < 0 and
qs(q
2
n − qs(qs − cLs )) − cHs q2n > qs(q2n − qs(qs − cLs )) − qnqs(cLs + qn − qs) = qs(qs − cLs )(qn −
qs) > 0. After some algebra, we have
v(qn(cHs qn−qs(cLs +qn−qs))+v(qs(q2n−qs(qs−cLs ))−cHs q2n))
2(qn−qs)qs((1−v)qn−vqs) < 0 iff
v < qn(qs(c
L
s +qn−qs)−cHs qn)
qs(q2n−qs(qs−cLs ))−cHs q2n
. Our assumption 2 is equivalent to v < qn
qn+qs
. It directly follows from
qn(qs(cLs +qn−qs)−cHs qn)
qs(q2n−qs(qs−cLs ))−cHs q2n
− qn
qn+qs
= − (c
H
s −cLs )q2nqs
(qn+qs)(q2n−qs(qs−cLs ))−cHs q2n)
< 0 that 0 < qn(qs(c
L
s +qn−qs)−cHs qn)
qs(q2n−qs(qs−cLs ))−cHs q2n
<
qn
qn+qs
. Therefore, we have that |Vr| consistently decreases on cLs ∀cn ∈ (
cLs qn
qs
, c
H
s qn
qs
− v(c
H
s −cLs )
1−v ]
iff v < qn(qs(c
L
s +qn−qs)−cHs qn)
qs(q2n−qs(qs−cLs ))−cHs q2n
; otherwise if v > qn(qs(c
L
s +qn−qs)−cHs qn)
qs(q2n−qs(qs−cLs ))−cHs q2n
, there exists a unique c̄n
such that if c
L
s qn
qs
< cn ≤ c̄n, then ∂|Vr|∂cLs ≤ 0; if c̄n < cn ≤
cHs qn
qs
− v(c
H
s −cLs )
1−v , then
∂|Vr|
∂cLs
> 0.
Proof. Proposition 2.6
We discuss the value of information to the retailer throughout all possible parameter settings
and show that |Vr| is firstly insensitive to qn if cn is very low. As cn increases, |Vr| starts to
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increase on qn and then decreases on qn. The trend with respect to qn varies depending on
the parameter range.
Under the parameter Setting cLs + qn − qs <
cHs qn
qs
, if cn ≤ c
L
s qn
qs
, ∂|Vr|
∂qn
= 0. If c
L
s qn
qs
< cn ≤
(cLs +qn−qs)((1−v)qn−vqs)+vcLs qn
(1−v)qn ,
∂|Vr|
∂qn
= (1−v)
2v(cLs qn−cnqs)(cLs qn((1+v)qn−3vqs)−cn(2(1−v)q2n−(1−v)qnqs−vq2s))
4(qn−qs)2((1−v)qn−vqs)3
.
If follows from cn ≥ c
L
s qn
qs
and 2(1 − v)q2n − (1 − v)qnqs − vq2s = (1 − v)(qn − qs) + (1 −
v)q2n − vq2s > 0 that
∂|Vr|
∂qn
> 0 iff cn >
cLs qn(qn+vqn−3vqs)
2(1−v)q2n−(1−v)qnqs−vq2s
. With some algebra, we can show
that c
L
s qn(qn+vqn−3vqs)
2(1−v)q2n−(1−v)qnqs−vq2s
− c
L
s qn
qs
= −2c
L
s qn((1−v)q2n−vq2s+v(qn−qs))
qs(2(1−v)q2n−(1−v)qnqs−vq2s)
< 0. Thus we have ∂|Vr|
∂qn
> 0
for cnε(
cLs qn
qs
, (c
L
s +qn−qs)((1−v)qn−vqs)+vcLs qn
(1−v)qn ]. If
(cLs +qn−qs)((1−v)qn−vqs)+vcLs qn
(1−v)qn < cn ≤ c
L
s + qn − qs,
∂|Vr|
∂qn
= −v(qs−c
L
s )
2
4q2n
< 0.
Under parameter setting c
H
s qn
qs
< cLs + qn − qs, if cn ≤
cLs qn
qs
, ∂|Vr|
∂qn
= 0. If c
L
s qn
qs
<
cn ≤ c
H
s qn
qs
− v(c
H
s −cLs )
1−v , similar to the proof in parameter Setting c
L
s + qn − qs <
cHs qn
qs
with
cnε(
cLs qn
qs
, (c
L
s +qn−qs)((1−v)qn−vqs)+vcLs qn
(1−v)qn ), we can show that
∂|Vr|
∂qn
> 0. If c
H
s qn
qs
− v(c
H
s −cLs )
1−v <
cn ≤ cLs + qn − qs −
v(cHs −cLs )
1−v ,
∂|Vr|
∂qn
= v(c
H
s −cLs )(2(1−v)cn−(1−3v)cHs −(1+v)cLs )
4(1−v)(qn−qs)2
so that ∂|Vr|
∂qn
> 0 iff
cn >
(1−3v)cHs +(1+v)cLs
2(1−v) . After some algebra, we show that
(1−3v)cHs +(1+v)cLs
2−2v − (
cHs qn
qs
− v(c
H
s −cLs )
1−v ) =
cHs qs+c
L
s qs−2cHs qn
2qs
< 0. Thus it directly follows that ∂ |Vr|
∂qn
> 0 for cnε(
cHs qn
qs
− v(c
H
s −cLs )
1−v , c
L
s + qn −
qs − v(c
H
s −cLs )
1−v ]. If c
L
s + qn − qs −
v(cHs −cLs )
1−v < cn ≤ c
L
s + qn − qs,
∂|Vr|
∂qn
= −v(c
H
s −cLs )
2
4(qn−qs)2
< 0.
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